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ABSTRACT
This study is an analysis of Indo-American relations 
between 1947 and 1972. What this thesis seeks to achieve 
is an understanding of the principal factors that 
determined Indo-American bilateral relations.
In this thesis, it will be argued that the absence of 
common Indian and American strategic interests and global 
perceptions were a manifestation of their different 
historical experiences and geographic locations. Further, 
since the limited contact, prior to 1947, provided little 
foundation upon which to build bilateral ties, Indo-US 
relations were moulded by the international strategic 
environment, which is to say, bilateral relations depended 
upon whether any compatibility of interests and policies 
could be formally recognised.
This analysis of Indo-US relations suggests that, when 
nations have different objectives and interests, the 
intensity of bilateral relations is dependent upon 
strategic perceptions. Only when the strategic perceptions 
and immediate interests of India and the United States 
converged did Indo-American bilateral relations perceptibly 
improve.
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AN ANALYSIS OF 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS 
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
1947 - 1972
INTRODUCTION
Analysing Indo-American relations as they evolved after 
India's independence from the British in 1947 is, indeed, a 
daunting task. Separated by more than merely geography, the 
two countries stumbled into each other's presence in the 
1940s, spent almost a decade attempting to understand the 
logic that propelled each other's ideas and perceptions of 
the world, settled down in the 1960s to build bridges and 
link their destinies, only to find that they were unable, in 
reality, to transform hopes and aspirations into concrete 
policies that could be characterized as a mutual identity of 
purpose. While nation states in the latter half of the 
twentieth century rarely admit that they are at "logger 
heads" with each other, I do not think it is presumptuous of 
me to characterize Indo-US relations in the period between 
1947 and 1972 as a series of alternating currents; flowing 
at times harmoniously together and, at other times, at cross 
purposes.
That relations between the two largest and most 
dissimilar democratic republics did not mature into settled 
patterns earlier, despite some eagerness on both sides, can 
be attributed, in part, to the numerous factors and 
considerations that separate the two countries. Even a
2
3casual glance at a map of the world reveals the distance 
that separates India from the United States. Geography, 
moreover, contributed to the divergent historical traditions 
experienced by the two countries. Although both countries 
had, at one time or another, been colonies of the British 
Empire, the similarity in their respective historical 
traditions ends there. America won her independence from 
the British in the eighteenth century, over eighty years 
before the first major revolt against the British by Indians 
in 1857, and over a century before the founding of the 
Indian National Congress, India's first nationalist 
political party, in 1885. Further, it was not until the 
United States entered the Second World War in 1941 that 
India and the United States came into official contact with 
each other.
Although Indian history, like its American counterpart, 
demonstrates the assimilation of varied cultures to form a
heterogenous Indian character, the vast majority of foreign
invaders that eventually represented an ethnic stream of 
Indian culture were primarily Asian in origin. The fact 
that the British were always regarded as foreigners and that 
political developments in Europe and the Western world never 
had a profound impact on events in India, even whilst a 
colony, says something about the divergence in historical 
experiences between India and the Western world.
Another factor that played a considerable role in
accentuating the differences between India and the United 
States in the latter half of the twentieth century was the
difference in status beween the two countries. The United 
States emerged from the Second World War as the world's 
premier economic, military and diplomatic power. India, on 
the other hand, only won her independence in 1947, was 
racked by civil strife, and was an economic basket case, 
unable to survive, it appeared, without substantial 
assistance from the United States, the only country in 1947 
in a position to help alleviate India's economic plight.
Despite the tremendous dissimilarities between the 
United States and India, both countries initiated official 
relations with the other with considerable optimism for 
close bilateral relations. The United States initially 
looked upon India as a prospective ally, based primarily 
upon the fact that both countries were democracies and upon 
India's ties with Britain and the Commonwealth. India, 
concurrently, looked towards the United States as a 
potential ally in her crusade against colonialism, and as a 
government from whom India could expect economic assistance. 
However, this mutual optimism, as subsequent developments 
proved, was ill-founded and misdirected.
The different historical experiences and geographic 
locations of India and the United States manifested 
themselves in the garb of divergent strategic interests and 
global perceptions. Containing the twin threats of the 
Soviet Union and international communism had, by 1947, 
become the corner-stone of American foreign policy. India, 
on the other hand, regarded the Cold War as a derivative of 
Western historical experience, which it did not share. As
5the first Asian nation to win its independence, India 
focussed upon anti-colonialism and the representation of 
Asian interests in a world still largely defined from a 
Western persective.
In this thesis, it will be argued that the absence of 
common Indian and American strategic perceptions was a 
manifestation of their different historical experiences and 
geographical locations. Further, since the limited contact 
between the two countries, prior to 1947, provided little 
foundation upon which to build bilateral ties, Indo-American 
relations were moulded by the international security 
environment, which is to say, bilateral relations depended 
upon whether any compatibility of interests and policies 
could be formally recognised. However, each government 
defined its political and military objectives in a manner 
that encroached upon the other’s interests, thus making x 
collaboration extremely difficult. Even though both India 
and the United States shared common interests in their 
antipathy to colonialism and communism, for example, they 
differed in their methods of opposing these forces, and they 
perceived threats to peace differently.
Having determined that it was the international 
security environment that moulded Indo-US relations, rather 
than a common strategic perspective, it is important to 
describe the weave that patterned these relations.
India, in 1947, had little diplomatic power, negligible 
military strength, and no economic infrastructure that could 
be of any fundamental benefit to the United States.
6Moreover, since divergent historical experiences and 
geographical locations precluded the possibility of India 
sharing the United States1 strategic interests and global 
perceptions, there was little that India had to offer the 
United States in order for the latter to focus its attention 
on India. Although the United States did have a global 
vision of which the Indian sub-continent was a part, it 
would be unrealistic to expect the United States, a country 
which emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful 
global power, to develop a specific policy for India, an 
infant states sans military muscle or economic power and 
struggling for its existence. In other words, India could 
be of significance to the United States only if it 
identified with US interests and objectives. India, on the 
other hand, because of the divergence in status between the 
two countries, had continually to recognise the importance 
of the United States as a central figure in its foreign 
policy planning. Because the United States was the world's 
leading global power, almost all its actions— diplomatic, 
military or economic— had a repercussion in India, whether 
India was the intended beneficiary or not. India, in 
contrast, was of value to the United States only if it 
adjusted its global perceptions to identify with those held 
by the United States, the dominant partner in the 
relationship.
That, in essence, is the pattern that describes Indo-US 
relations in the period between 1947 and 1972. Because of 
the limited political contacts between the two countries
7prior to 1947, and the different historical traditions and 
geographical locations of India and the United States, it 
was the international strategic environment that moulded 
Indo-American relations. Moreover, and more important, it 
was only when India adjusted her strategic perceptions to be 
in identity with those of the United States that relations 
between the two countries perceptibly improved.
While this thesis, through a narration and analysis of 
events, serves as an example to show how relations between a 
global power and Third World nation evolves, what it 
demonstrates quite conclusively is that bilateral relations 
between countries of divergent sizes and power do not hinge 
upon stated long term objectives, however much these 
objectives may be in congruence. Instead, this analysis of 
Indo-US relations suggests that, when nations have different 
objectives and interests, the intensity of bilateral 
relations is dependent upon strategic perceptions. Only 
when the strategic perceptions and immediate interests of 
India and the United States converged did Indo-US bilateral 
relations perceptibly improve.
I am not suggesting that the convergence and divergence 
of strategic interests and perceptions is the only factor 
that determined the nature of Indo-American relations. 
Individuals played a significant role in the maturing of 
these relations, as evidenced by the difference Ambassadors 
Chester Bowles and John Kenneth Galbraith made to Indian 
attitudes towards America, as determined by the importance 
President Kennedy placed upon India's economic success, and
as demonstrated by the common personal antipathy which 
President Nixon and Prime Minister Gandhi held for each 
other. Similarly, the liberal beliefs of Kennedy's 
Administation resulted in a major swing in Indo-US 
relations, as did Prime Minister Nehru's personality and 
commitment to an independent foreign policy for an 
independent India. While all these factors, among others, 
manifested themselves in ways that helped influence Indo-US 
relations, it would be inaccurate to suggest that 
Indo-American relations hinged primarily on these factors.
Indo-American relations beween 1947 and 1972, as this 
thesis demonstrates, were unplanned, therefore 
unpredictable. Although both countries shared common long 
term objectives, immediate bilateral relations were shaped 
by the international strategic environment. Since there was 
a disparity in the status of the two countries and in terms 
of one's importance to the other, it was only when India 
adjusted her global perceptions to identify with those of 
the United States, or when their interests were in 
congruence, that bilateral relations perceptibly improved.
In other words, what this thesis demonstrates is the fact 
that the intensity of Indo-US relations between 1947 and 
1972 was determined by the convergence and divergence of 
strategic perceptions.
It is when their strategic perceptions and interests 
have been in tandem that the two countries have shared 
warmer bilateral relations. At other times, when there has 
been a divergence in interests and perceptions, the
9relationship can be described as one of exasperatedly 
strained cordiality, like a couple that can neither get 
along nor separate, given the fact that the two countries 
shared declared long term interests and objectives, but 
divergent perceptions.
Since the differences and changes in perceptions by the 
United States and India, between 1947 and 1972, were most 
marked with respect to the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan, 
the three countries of greatest common strategic importance 
to India and the United States, we find that this study of 
Indo-US relations, while highlighting the changing 
international strategic environment in general, focusses 
most closely on these three countries in particular. It is 
when the views of India and the United States, with 
particular respect to China, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, 
have converged and been in harmony that Indo-American 
bilateral relations adopted a warmer tone.
I have focussed my attention on three periods, or case 
studies, really, to facilitate the conduct of my study.
This study of Indo-US relations does not attempt to describe 
and analyse the period 1947 to 1972 in its entirety. The 
three periods upon which I have focussed are what I consider 
to be the most significant, and represent the clearest 
fluctuations in Indo-US relations, namely that of the 
periods beween 1947 and 1954, 1961 and 1965, and 1969 and 
1972.
The first case study, 1947-54, is important because it 
describes the early tentative appraisals undertaken by both
10
countries in attempting to understand and evaluate each 
other. This period highlights the differences in 
perceptions beween the United States and India through a 
variety of interests. The United States was, in 1947, 
primarily interested in containing the expansion of the 
Soviet communist threat, a perception India did not share. 
Although India was clearly closer to the United States than 
the Soviet Union, it did not share the American perspective 
or agree with the method chosen by the United States to 
contain communist Russia. When China fell to the communists 
in 1949, America viewed this development with alarm while 
India welcomed the development and declared its Asian 
foreign policy objectives as being in tandem with those of 
China. Further, by chosing non-alignment as the principal 
vehicle for its foreign policy, India chose not to ally with 
the United States in containing the communist nations to its 
immediate north, China and the Soviet Union. Having 
consciously decided against allying with the United States, 
India found that America entered a military relationship 
with Pakistan, India's antagonistic neighbour, in 1954.
The years between 1947 and 1954 swing from a period 
where the two countries are optimistic about the future of 
Indo-US relations, to a period when divergent strategic 
perceptions with regard to the Soviet Union and China forces 
the United States to select Pakistan as its Asian ally, 
isolating India in the process. A detailed study of this 
period highlights how different historical experiences and 
geographical locations led to divergent strategic
11
perspectives, which in turn caused the two countries to view 
each other with suspicion and mistrust.
The second case study, 1961-65, is in direct contrast 
to the earlier period for a variety of reasons. The 
American Administration under John F. Kennedy was more 
benevolent towards Indiafs policy of non-alignment and 
recognised the importance of India to the future of Asia. 
Moreover, China's attack on India in 1962 forced India to 
repudiate its earlier entente with China, making India view 
China in much the same way as the United States did. With 
China's attack of India in 1962, Indian and American 
strategic perceptions, for the first time, merged, leading 
to large scale assistance by the United States and the 
expectation of closer long-term bilateral relations. This 
was due entirely to the fact that India's perceptions were 
in tandem with US views on the threat of communist China, 
thus making closer bilateral ties possible. However, soon 
after the threat of a resumption of conflict passed, 
differences in perception between the two countries came to 
the surface again, causing relations to return to their 
earlier status quo.
The last case study, 1969-72, is an interesting example 
of the United States' geopolitical objectives clashing with 
India's regional security needs. The United States "tilts" 
towards Pakistan as the latter facilitates its opening to 
China, an important geopolitical objective of the Nixon 
Administration. India, on the other hand, helped achieve 
the liberation of Bangladesh, resulting in a war with
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Pakistan. This war, moreover, threatened to disrupt the 
United States' geopolitical design, leading to severely 
strained relations between the United States and India.
As will become evident from the third study, India and 
the United States had entirely different strategic 
objectives born out of divergent interests, a factor that 
caused the foreign policies of the two countries to encroach 
upon the interests of each other. Moreover, in keeping with 
the hypothesis of this thesis, the divergence in strategic 
perceptions and interests led to a period of extremely 
strained Indo-US relations.
Thus, Indo-US relations between 1947 and 1972 can be 
characterized as a series of alternating currents, sometimes 
flowing harmoniously together and, at other times, 
clashing. The alternations caused by the divergent 
perceptions and strategic interests of the two countries, 
are: global aspirations vs. regional realities? security 
pacts vs. non-alignment; friendship and convergence of 
interests vs. alienation.
These are the themes of foreign policy which proved so 
very difficult to align. Only occasionally, and under 
certain circumstances, was it to happen, despite best 
intentions and high hopes on both sides.
We will return to these general observations in the 
concluding chapter, but the next step in the development of 
this argument is to review Indo-American relations as they 
evolved after India's independence from the British in 1947.
CHAPTER ONE
To one analysing Indo-American relations as they 
evolved after 1947, the maturing of these relations, in the 
early years, appears as a painfully slow process completely 
devoid of any constructive exchange of ideas and assessments 
of the respective positions adopted by the two governments. 
When viewed, however, in the light of the limited contacts 
that the two sides had had with each other prior to 1947, it 
is not surprising that the succeeding years were exhausted 
in attempting to evaluate and understand each other1s 
positions, with little apparent movement. Thus, any attempt 
at explaining the attitudes adopted by India and the United 
States towards each other immediately after August 15, 1947, 
necessitates a re-capitulation of the limited political 
relations between the states in the pre-1947 period.
With the bombing of Pearl Harbour and America joining 
the Allied cause in World War II, Americans were forced to 
focus their attention on a country that had long been 
considered Great Britain's problem. Prior to 1942, although 
liberal American journals had been sympathetic to the 
position of the Indian National Congress and their 
opposition to being dragged into a European war without any 
guarantees of political benefits, the prevalent attitude
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remained that India was not of immediate American 
concern.1
Until the summer of 1941, American reports of 
developments in India were routed through London, an 
inconvenience that did not necessarily reflect an unbiased 
view of the state of the nationalist movement. That year, 
the Indian and American governments exchanged diplomatic 
missions, an exchange that established diplomatic relations 
although the Indian agent-general, Girja Shankar Bajpai, was 
attached to the British embassy in Washington. This proved 
to be a crucial factor in influencing official American 
opinion on India, an exchange that "served the American need 
for more extensive, reliable, and direct information from 
India and underscored to Indians, Americans, and the British 
the official interest m  India."*
In August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued the Atlantic 
Charter, a declaration of war aims that later became the 
focus of American ideological concern with Indian 
nationalism. The point most relevant to the Indian context 
was the second clause of Article 3, which read, "and they 
hope that sovereign rights and self-government may be 
restored to those from whom it has been forcibly 
removed."3 Whilst the Indian question was not on the 
official agenda for talks between the two allied leaders, 
the association of the Atlantic Charter with India came to 
light when Churchill told the House of Commons that Article 
3 did not apply to the British Empire. He maintained that
15
the article was directed at people under Nazi hegemony; 
countries under allegiance to the British crown were not the 
focus of the Atlantic Charter. While liberal American 
reaction to Churchill's speech reflected disillusionment and 
demanded a response from Roosevelt, the President was not 
forthcoming with his views on the subject, despite repeated 
criticism of the British by Thomas Wilson, the American 
representative in India.4
Coinciding with the attack on Pearl Harbour and 
America's growing involvement with the war, and Indian 
leaders' requests to Roosevelt to intervene on their behalf, 
official American interest in British-Indian relations 
increased substantially, culminating in the April 1942 Louis 
Johnson mission to India as the President's "special 
representative."5 Johnson, reflecting America's new 
interest in the political developments of India's national 
movement, attempted to mediate between the British 
authorities and Indian nationalists in arriving at a 
political settlement.
Earlier, although Churchill had reacted adversely to 
Roosevelt questioning him on India when the former visited 
Washington in December 1941, the American Government 
continued to press their British counterparts to define a 
positive approach towards solving the problems in India.6 
Responding to Churchill's justification for continued 
British presence in India because of the diversity of 
religions and the inability of the Indian National Congress 
to represent all groups, Roosevelt wrote a long letter to
16
Churchill in which he drew parallels between the Indian 
position and that of the American colonies immediately after 
America's independence. Urging the British to arrive at a 
political settlement, he ended the letter by saying:
For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, 
although I do want to be of help. It is, strictly 
speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it 
is a part and parcel of the successful fight you and 
I are making.7
Johnson, on arriving in India, immersed himself in the 
deliberations between the Indian leaders and the Cripps 
mission that had arrived in India to negotiate a political
, Q  . .
solution. By 1942, however, Indian affairs could not be 
viewed independently of Japanese advances in Southeast Asia 
and up to Burma, India's neighbour. Johnson, viewing his 
mission as an outcome of Roosevelt's obvious interest in 
finding a solution for Indian independence, did his best to 
prevent the negotiations from stalling, advising both 
Stafford Cripps and the Indian leaders, even suggesting 
alternatives to the original Cripps' proposal.9 Despite 
Johnson's attempts to find a compromise solution, the talks 
failed, however, and Churchill wrote to Roosevelt justifying 
his attempts at having "proved the British desire to reach a 
settlement." Roosevelt, acting on Johnson's view that 
Cripps' position in India had been undermined by both the 
British viceroy in India and Churchill, replied:
... I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with this 
point of view set forth in your message to me. ...
The feeling is almost universally held that that the
17
deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the 
British Government to concede to the Indians the 
right of self government, notwithstanding the 
willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, 
military, and naval defense control to the competent 
British authorities.10
Even though the Louis Johnson mission to India failed, 
it is important to recognise it as the first public 
demonstration of the Roosevelt Administation's genuine 
interest in the Indian national movement. It is evident 
from the tone of Roosevelt*s letter that the US Government 
disagreed entirely with the British position in India, but 
it is pertinent to observe that the Americans, whilst 
disagreeing on ideological grounds with their wartime ally, 
were unable to press the point further because of the 
greater importance of the threat that faced them, Japanese 
advances in Asia. The attempt, however, could not have been 
entirely lost in the minds of the Indian nationalists? 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Johnson were able to become friends, 
and this effort undoubtedly contributed substantially to the 
widespread belief "that the US government would be the most 
helpful foreign agency in backing Congress objectives."11
During the rest of 1942, the Indian question, for the 
United States, became entangled with the military effort.
As seen from the perspective of the Defense Department, the 
security of India was vital to the preservation of Allied 
control of the Middle East. In spite of repeated urgings by 
the press, US representatives in India, Chiang Kai-shek, and 
a personal appeal from Gandhi, the Roosevelt Administration
18
was reluctant to bring pressure to bear on Britain as long 
as military planning remained the priority.12 Roosevelt 
would only go so far as admitting to Gandhi the need for 
Allied harmony, implicitly outlining the dilemma his 
administration had been caught in and their inability to 
focus their attention on the nationalist movement.
Thus, when the United States failed to support the 
Indian national movement publicly at a time when Indian 
leaders were being thrown into jail and their movement 
violently suppressed, J the mutual distrust that was to 
characterize so many of their later contacts, surfaced. 
Congress leaders had come to view the United States as the 
only nation capable of pressuring the British to find an 
immediate solution, and when they found little public or 
official support for their position, their view of the 
United States soured.14
In December 1942, William Phillips was designated as 
the President's personal representative to India. Phillips' 
experience and seniority within the diplomatic community 
reflected Roosevelt's attempt to break the impasse that had 
developed in India. While Phillips conceived his role as 
one of gaining the confidence of the various groups and of 
becoming a center around which some of the problems might be 
resolved, the British blunted his efforts by refusing him 
permission to meet any of the jailed nationalist leaders. 
Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, succinctly stated 
the Administration's position when he said, "... on the 
question of India, while the President is missing no
19
opportunities, we cannot do much if the British are 
immovable."15
Concurrently, Phillips' silence and inability to 
intercede was being viewed by Indians, unaware of his 
petitions to the Viceroy, as a reflection of the US' 
superficial interest in India, further deepening the 
mistrust developing in the Indian attitude towards the 
United States.
Realising his inability to help alleviate the 
situation, Phillips urged Roosevelt to allow him to return 
to Washington, merely four months after his appointment. 
Although Phillips submitted his resignation on his return to 
Washington, it was not accepted until March 1945, even 
though he never returned to India.
Phillips' anomolous status reflected Roosevelt's 
uncertainty about Indian policy. To have accepted 
Phillips' resignation earlier would have increased 
Indian criticism, but to have dispatched Phillips 
to India would have rekindled Indian hopes and 
invited difficulties with the British.
From the departure of Phillips until the end of the 
European war in May 1945, the US maintained a more distant 
role in Indian developments. Phillips was not followed by 
another high ranking diplomat, a fact which probably 
symbolized Roosevelt's acknowledgement that, owing to 
Churchill's intransigience, assisting India was beyond 
America's capability without risking Allied disharmony.
These, then, were the limited official contacts between 
India and the United States under British India. We move
20
now to the first of my case studies, the early tentative 
appraisals and evaluations by independent India and the 
United States between 1947 and 1954.
21
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CHAPTER TWO
The first of my case studies, the period between 1947 
and 1954, is an analysis of the factors and issues that were 
at play in giving Indo-US relations their initial shape and 
form. This chapter includes an analysis of the early 
tentative appraisals, individual perceptions of common 
global issues, and the search for common ground upon which 
to build bilateral relations.
INDIA FASHIONS A POLICY
With the attainment of independence in August 1947, 
India had to structure a foreign policy that would serve its 
national interests as an independent country, rejecting, in 
large measure, the foreign policy of its erstwhile British 
rulers which had been fashioned around the interests of 
British imperialism in Asia. This was no easy task. The 
new Indian government had two distinct traditions in foreign 
policy thinking. The first was the policy they inherited 
from the British, and the second was the ideas of the 
leaders of the Congress party. Although the Congress 
government under Jawaharlal Nehru relied on their own 
opinions and views in defining a policy for India, their 
views were, indirectly, an outcome of their experiences
22
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under the British.
In the 192 0s and 1930s, the Congress party identified 
India's political struggle with world movements against 
imperialism and all forms of oppression. It gave expression 
to this view by supporting nationalist movements in other 
countries, and with support for China which was under attack 
by Japan in the mid 1930s.1 In addition, Britain had 
successfully guaranteed India's security for the better part 
of a century, making most Indians complacent and naive about 
international issues and the threat of foreign attack.
Nehru, accepting Gandhi's philosophy that fear was the cause 
of most wars, believed that if India avoided military 
alignments and remained aloof from international conflicts, 
there would be no reason to fear an attack on its borders, 
and, more importantly, not much chance of getting involved 
in a war. This attitude, moreover, was essential, according 
to Nehru, if independent India was to concentrate on 
building the nation as, "without peace, all our dreams are 
vanished and reduced to ashes."2
Although India's policy of non-alignment was 
responsible for thrusting it forward into the international 
arena in the early 1950s, it is inaccurate to state that 
Nehru's government embraced this policy, as it later came to 
be defined, as early as 1947. India's desire to renounce 
the power politics that was dividing the world into 
ideological camps in the years of the Cold War was more the 
result of a reaction against its colonial past than an 
ideological commitment that recognised the benefits of
24
non-alignment as a policy. Proud of being the first Asians
to shake off their colonial rulers, Indians guarded their
independence with a zeal that obscured the realities of
international affairs. Independence, to Nehru, meant more
than the departure of the British and the birth of an
independent nation ruled by an indigenous government.
Independence meant more than the culmination of a
nationalist movement to obtain freedom; it was the
perception of Indians, being recognised by the rest of the
world, as masters of their own destiny. As Nehru told the
Constituent Assembly in 1948:
What does independence consist of? It consists 
fundamentally and basically of foreign 
relations. That is the test of independence. 
All else is local autonomy. Once foreign 
relations go out of your hand, into the charge 
of somebody else, to that extent and in that 
measure you are not independent.3
Independence, to Nehru, was the assertion of the principles 
that constituted the term.
Born at a time when the world was divided into 
antagonistic ideological camps, with states aligning 
themselves with the two groups that constituted the bipolar 
world, India's policy of keeping itself out of the Cold War 
was bound to attract global attention. Nehru had reasoned 
that non-alignment was the best means of asserting India's 
true independence, as well as achieving a stature of 
significance in international affairs.4 In the late 
1940s, however, whilst India attracted global attention as a 
result of its unique status in the international community,
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the rapidly changing configuration of world politics denied 
Nehru the niche he desired in global politics; the evolving 
alignment of states into a bipolar system preoccupied the 
time and attention of the major governments, and India 
seemed to have no place in the evolving scheme. The 
benefits of non-alignment and its contribution to global 
politics was not recognised until the 1950s.
In the interim, both the Soviet Union and Western 
governments viewed India's policy of non-alignment as merely 
a verbal exercise, and were skeptical of its supposedly true 
intentions. The Soviet Union saw India as essentially 
committed to the West, an outcome made plausible by the 
adoption of the constitutional system chosen by India, and 
necessitated by economic needs. The Soviets denounced the 
Indian position as a policy of collaboration with British 
imperialism, and, suspicious of everyone not completely on 
their side, pressed India to make up its mind and refrain
c
from remaining aloof. The United States, on the other 
hand, was disappointed with India as it initially looked at 
India as a candidate for the "free world", based primarily 
upon the fact that both countries were democracies and upon 
India's ties with the United Kingdom.6 Thus, 
non-alignment in the 194 0s remained a policy that won India 
few favours, and which, with the major governments of the 
world doubting India's intentions, was perceived as an 
academic posture that was bound to change to fit the 
evolving structure of world politics.
In the period immediately after the attainment of
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independence, India's prestige was initially rather high in 
the eyes of the American administration; its grappling with 
monumental domestic problems and its active role in the 
United Nations enhanced this prestige, although there was 
official concern over India's policy towards Pakistan.7 
In response to the growing antagonism between Pakistan and 
India over the status of Kashmir, the US government decided 
to adopt a neutral stance, rejecting the plea for military 
assistance by Pakistan and adopting a similar approach to 
the expected Indian demand.8
The Soviet Union was active in 1948 in directing the 
Communist Party of India to rebellion,9 and American 
officials were worried, as was the Indian government, about 
communist advances in India through the local communist 
party, a fear enhanced by the activities of the Soviet 
Ambassador in New Delhi.10 The Soviets made it clear to 
the Indian Ambassador in Moscow that they were not content 
with India's intended lack of hostility; "the world is 
divided into two great camps, the democratic and 
imperialistic and it is now up to India to decide which side 
she is going to take."11
The Soviets may not have been entirely wrong in being 
skeptical of India's avowed policy of non-alignment. 
Sarvepalli Gopal, Nehru's biographer, contends that Indian 
non-alignment, in the early years, was clearly benevolent to 
the West. Probably as a result of Soviet pressure on 
the Indian government, Nehru took it upon himself to clarify 
to the United States, through diplomatic channels, that it
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was unthinkable for India to be on Russia"s side in the 
event of a conflict between the two superpowers.13
In an interview with Michael Brecher, Krishna Menon, a 
close confidante of Nehru's, argued that the genesis of 
non-alignment was a desire to remain aloof from the 
ideological conflict that was dividing the world in 1947.
He contends that the political benefits of this policy were 
not realised till much later, as was the contribution India 
could make in international disputes.14 In the light of 
this argument— India did not align itself with either bloc 
because it did not share the fundamental reasons that were 
responsible for their creation— it is easy to explain how 
India, despite its proclaimed policy of non-alignment, was 
closer to the West, thus understanding the wavering in 
India's commitment to non-alignment. The open hostility of 
the Soviet Union and the conflict with the Communist Party 
of India were only some of the more obvious factors.
India's military weakness, its economic dependence on the 
West, and the spill-over of India's conflict with Pakistan 
over the status of Kashmir were all powerful factors that 
pressured India to seek closer relations with Britain and 
the United States.15
Despite its initial disappointment about the Indian 
position on non-alignment, the United States seems to have 
recognised Indian fears regarding the Soviet Union and its 
ties with the Indian communists. It is safe to presume that 
Americans were also aware that India leaned closer to the 
West than towards the Soviet Union, but, in the late 1940s,
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Indo-US relations were stagnant in that no major policies
were initiated by either government. India, as mentioned
earlier, had told the American government that it was
unlikely to be on the Soviet*s side in the event of a
conflict; the American position, on the other hand, was
delivered to Girja Bajpai, Secretary General of India's
foreign office:
It was the considered opinion of the United 
States Government that in the long term close 
and friendly relations between India and the 
United States was the anchor of stability of 
the whole area from Africa to South East Asia. 
Unfortunately, at the moment the United States 
found it necessary to concentrate its efforts 
and resources on resisting aggression in other 
parts of the world.16
As mentioned earlier, one of the important factors that 
led to the Indian government's clearly pro-Western stance in 
foreign affairs stemmed from its need for Western economic 
aid in developing the nation. Substantial economic aid, 
however, was not made available by the United States, the 
only country in a position to assist India, a development 
that seemed to irritate Nehru and strengthen his belief that 
America, despite public proclamations to the contrary, was 
evidently more interested in seeking closer relations with 
"imperialists*' in Europe than in supporting the growing tide 
on nationalism in Asia.17 As the Cold War progressed, 
Indians were disappointed to observe that the United States 
laid utmost emphasis on maintaining strong ties with 
European colonial powers, ignoring, in the process, its 
commitment to anti-colonialism. Moreover, this seemed, to
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Indians, to be in keeping with their earlier limited 
experiences with the US in the years of the nationalist 
movement; Roosevelt would demonstrate interest and concern 
for Indian nationalism, but refuse to press the issue with 
Churchill when the latter adopted a strong stand against 
Indian nationalism, effectively sacrificing his principles 
to the American interest of maintaining cordial relations 
with Britain.
THE UNITED STATES AS A SUPERPOWER
To a neutral observer, the Indian attitude, admittedly, 
refused to recognise the United States1 position in global 
politics and the inherent forces at play. It is thus 
pertinent, at this point, to analyse the American position 
from a geo-strategic perspective in an attempt to understand 
where and why India stood in their global outlook.
With the end of the Second World War, Americans were 
forced to accept their position as a superpower, abandoning 
the advice of their first President, George Washington, to 
stay away from the politics that guided the destinies of 
European nations. Around the same time that India won its 
freedom from the British in 1947, George F. Kennan was 
appointed to the position of Director of the newly 
constituted Policy Planning Staff charged with "formulating 
and developing ... long-term programs for the achievement of 
US foreign policy objectives." Recognising that the United 
States only had limited resources with which to fight Soviet 
communist expansion, Kennan set about devising a strategy of
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containment, and it is now certain that Kennanfs 
recommendations paralleled the thinking of the 
administration he served from 1947 until well into
i p , , ,
1949. ° Kennan believed that American security could be 
attained by ensuring that the four centers of industrial and 
military power, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and central Europe, and Japan, that were not under 
the Soviet Union*s control did not fall under the domination 
of Moscow. It was the combination of industrial and 
military power, which were concentrated in only these four 
areas and the USSR, that could affect the global balance of 
power, thus primary emphasis had to be maintained on the
1Q .defense of the four centers. The difference between the
policy recommended by Kennan and the earlier thinking of the
Truman Administration stemmed from the conviction that,
irrespective of the nature of the external threat, the
country only had limited resources with which to fight it.
Thus, "strongpoint defense" became the watchword of the
Truman Administration after 1947, concentating on the
defense of particular areas and the means of access to them,
rather than fighting communist expansion wherever it
appeared. As John Lewis Gaddis states,
The "strongpoint" concept permitted 
concentration on areas that were both 
defensible and vital, without worrying too much 
about the rest. The assumption was that not 
all interests were of equal importance; that 
the United States could tolerate the loss of 
peripheral areas provided this did not impair 
its ability to defend those that were 
vital.20
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Having decided upon a strategy of asymmetrical 
response, the United States categorized India as falling in 
the group of countries on the Asian mainland, from 
Afghanistan around to Korea, whose loss to the Soviet Union, 
though regrettable, would not fundamentally alter the 
balance of power and threaten American security. On a 
purely economic scale, the costs involved in defending the 
area far outweighed the possible contribution it could make 
to Soviet military capability, given the fact that the area 
lacked both industrial and military capabilities that could
• • , p ibe of immediate use to the Soviets.
The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee,
in a report in April 1949, said:
The basic strategic objectives of the US, with 
respect to South Asian countries are: ...
... (iii) to develop, without commitment to 
military action on our part, a cooperative 
attitude in these countries which would facilitate 
obtaining the use of areas or facilities which 
might be required by the Western democracies ... 
for military operations against the USSR in the 
event of war.22
India, however, was not asking for military protection 
by the United States. Whilst Indians like to believe that 
non-alignment deprived the US of an important ally in the 
1940s, this is not wholly in keeping with the facts. 
Americans may have been disappointed with the policy of 
non-alignment because that prevented India from publicly 
joining the chorus castigating the Soviet Union, but 
Kennan*s policy of containment clearly recommended that the 
United States remain aloof from military commitments in the
32
region, a recommendation the Administration followed, as 
evidenced by the policy statement quoted above.
Indian disillusionment resulted from the lack of 
financial assistance they had hoped for from the United 
States. The Indian tendency to equate the US with 
"imperialists" and "colonial" powers in Europe was based 
primarily on the resentment that America had a Marshall Plan 
for Europe, but nothing for the poor nations of Asia.23 
The reason, it appears, was a lack of understanding and 
appreciation of the American necessity for initiating the 
Marshall Plan, their obsession with the Soviet Union, and 
the fact that even the United States, the richest nation in 
the world, could be strapped for funds. I do not think it 
is pesumptuous to argue that this lack of appreciation by 
India lay in the fact that the contacts between the two 
countries were new, thus limited in that a mutual mistrust 
existed, and that India had initially expected substantial 
economic assistance from America, the absence of which 
proved to be most disappointing.
NEHRU VISITS WASHINGTON. 1949
It was primarily the recognition of the importance of 
close relations with the United States that prompted Nehru 
to accept President Truman's long-standing invitation to 
visit the United States in 1949. That Nehru appreciated the 
importance of his visit in attempting to transform relations 
from a level of cordiality to the entente he desired is 
evident from his frame of mind in preparing for the visit.
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"Why not," Nehru asked Krishna Menon somewhat rhetorically,
"align with the United States somewhat and build up our
• . oneconomic and military strength?"
The official talks, unfortunately, were far from 
successful. Considerable time was spent in exploring a 
solution to the problem in Kashmir, an issue on which 
Nehru's views were intractable, and US actions, as part of 
the United Nations Commission to arrange a truce between 
India and Pakistan, piqued the Indian Prime Minister.26 
Truman had written to both Indian and Pakistani prime 
ministers urging them to accept the commission's 
recommendations, but Nehru viewed the American position as 
unfair to India.26 The Americans, on the other hand, 
disagreed with Nehru on his assessment of events in China, 
and resented India's early recognition of the new communist 
government, which was clearly in the offing. Ambassador 
Jessup, of the US delegation to the UN, argued that there 
were many areas in China that were still under the control 
of the Kuomintang and that Indian recognition of the 
communists was premature.27 Nehru felt the Americans were 
stalling at a time when it was evident that the Kuomintang 
had lost to the communist rebels, but admitted to Truman 
that India's proximity to China favoured early
• « pc , ,recognition. ° As for economic assistance, Ambassador Loy 
W. Henderson, the US representative in India, had informed 
the Indian delegation that Truman was prepared to give India 
anything that Nehru asked for? Nehru, however, would do no 
more than state India's requirements of food and commodities
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in general terms. The result was that at a time when there 
was a glut of wheat in American markets, India was not even 
offered special terms, let alone the gift of a million tons
o Qthat was widely expected.
At about the same time as Nehru's visit to the United
States, India's position on non-alignment began to shift
from a pragmatic stand to a more ideological one.
Previously, India's world views could be predicted according
to the issue at hand? when it came to matters related to any
form of oppression— colonial, economic imperialism, or
racial— India could be expected to denounce it in all its
manifestations. On issues related to the Cold War, however,
India had preferred to remain neutral and distant. In
America, Nehru explained to the public that non-alignment
did not exclude commitment to principles, and that India's
detachment in the Cold War did not imply isolation and
indifference on basic issues. In Nehru's words,30
... Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened 
or where aggression takes place, we cannot and 
shall not be threatened. ... When Man's liberty or 
peace is in danger we cannot and shall not be
neutral? neutrality would be a betrayal of what we
have fought for and stand for.
In spite of Nehru's clarifications to the American 
public about the meaning of non-alignment and India's 
position on the ideological conflict of the time, Indian and 
American leaders parted in 1949 acknowledging that their 
policies and assessments diverged in fundamental ways. 
Nehru's visit reinforced the widespread view that, in spite 
of shared political traditions and commitments to democratic
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principles, the two countries were committed to separate
postures in the global political arena.
As a result, the US could not firmly reinforce 
India*s primary international objective, the 
eradication of colonialism; and India was unwilling 
to support the paramount American goal, the 
containment of communism.
As Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, summing up 
the despondency at the failure of the talks, said, "[Nehru] 
was so important to India and India's survival so important 
to all of us, that if he did not exist— as Voltaire said of 
God— he would have to be invented."32 But why was there 
general recognition in 1949 that the two countries' policies 
and assessments diverged in fundamental ways?
DIVERGENT STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
Nehru, in a report in early 1950, wrote, "If there is a 
world war, there is no possibility of India lining up with 
the Soviet Union whatever else she may do."33 On the 
surface, this sentence reflects the kind of rhetoric the US 
would have liked to hear from the Indians. The two 
countries disagreed, nevertheless, not at the level of 
action, but over the perception of the threat, the 
expansionary nature of international communism, and, as a 
consequence, over the appropriate response to that threat.
Nehru was convinced that the American response in 
concentrating on rigid military blocs and relying on 
ideological dogma was the wrong way to ward off the 
communist threat. He reasoned that the approach ought to be
36
less direct, although he did recommend resorting to other
means if faced with aggression.34 The US, on the other
hand, was apt to disregard Nehru*s attitude, guoted above,
as nothing more than benevolent neutralism. Analysing
America's reaction to Indian attitudes, Heimsath and
Mansingh wrote:
India's government betrayed its democratic 
political heritage, refused to face the challenges 
of the real world of power, and knowingly increased 
the prestige of "international communism" by 
refusing to align itself with Western policies and 
frequently criticizing the US. In the great 
struggle of ideologies India refused to commit 
itself; in the division of world opinion, the 
"battle for men's minds," in which every 
government, ultimately every person could be 
counted, India appeared to hold back. Such a 
wavering and indecisive posture could be called 
"immoral." At the very least it seemed unfriendly, 
at a time when the world's most powerful state 
"needed all the friends it could get" and 
unpopularity seemed the harbinger of defeat.35
The fall of China to a communist government in 1949-50 
is an important case in attempting to understand the 
divergence in policies and assessments between the US and 
India. It had been a fundamental objective of the Indian 
government's foreign policy to see the elimination of 
Western presence in Asia and to achieve the establishment of 
a grouping of states to promote distinctly Asian 
interests.36 India, as the first Asian nation to win 
independence, had hoped to spearhead this movement. This 
policy, however, was destined to clash with traditional 
American objectives in Asia. The Americans, at the end of 
the Second World War, had hoped to continue their alliance
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with China, strengthening the latter to promote US
37objectives m  the region. The success of the communist
rebels and the formation of a People's government, however,
was to lead to a re-evaluation of US strategy and the
attempt to find an alternative to Chiang Kai-shek on the
Asian mainland.
The shocks of 1949— principally the loss of China to
communism and the Soviet atomic bomb— led the Truman
Administration to repudiate Kennan's strategy of
containment, replaced instead by NSC-68 in 1950. The
industrial-military combination that determined the
strongpoint defense strategy of Kennan gave way to the need
to uphold the credibility of the American response, with
"perceptions" of power beginning to be of vital importance.
Thus, NSC-68 recommended perimeter defense, responding
wherever the Russians chose to challenge American
interests.38
In December 1950, a Department of State Policy
Statement suggested:
With China under Communist domination, Soviet power 
now encroaches along the perimeter of the Indian 
sub-continent. India has become the pivotal state 
in non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative
• • • O Qpower, stability and influence.
Another policy statement proposed by the National Security
Council stated even more specifically:
The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean 
that for all practical purposes all of Asia will 
have been lost; this would constitute a serious 
threat to the security position of the United 
States.
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Read in the light of the new American strategy of perimeter 
defense, it is apparent that the United States was beginning 
to look upon India as an alternative to China as its main 
Asian ally.
This, however, was in direct contrast to Indian 
interests. Whilst the United States desired to stem the 
spread of communist growth and inhibit the development of 
Chinese power, India was seeking closer ties with China in 
pursuit of its Asian objectives. China had, verbally at 
least, identified itself with a traditional Indian aim, the 
withdrawal of Western colonial presence from Asia.
Moreover, whilst America was antagonistic towards China 
because it viewed communist expansion in China as Soviet 
sponsored, Nehru did not share this opinion. The new 
Chinese government had come to power in their own way, 
largely as a result of the ineptitude of the Kuomintang 
regime. Nehru believed that China did not share Russia's 
aggressive view on international communism, and, having won 
power independently, the new Chinese government would 
concentrate on national development rather than be a mere 
camp follower of the Soviets on international issues;
China's size made Russian control over it impossible. 
Further, Nehru strongly argued for the early recognition of 
the new Chinese government, as all acts of hostility would 
only serve to encourage closer ties between China and the 
Soviet U n i o n . F i n a l l y ,  the US policy of viewing India 
as a prospective alternative to China for its Asian strategy 
opposed the tenets of non-alignment, a policy India was
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beginning to realise could play a positive role in 
international issues beyond the mere posturing it had 
allowed India to achieve immediately after independence.
Thus, by 1950, the US and India had come tp recognise 
the fact that the interests of one did not necessarily 
reflect the interests of the other, however regrettable that 
may have been. Although they shared democratic traditions 
and thought on similar lines on issues like liberty, 
justice, the pursuit of happiness, and freedom from 
oppression, their divergent experiences and needs brought to 
the surface their differences on assessments and interests. 
And, in the final analysis, relations between the two 
countries hinged on their attitudes and views on 
international issues, a gap that was difficult to bridge, 
given the divergence in the priorities of interest that 
determined the nature of each country"s foreign relations.
Containment of Soviet communist expansion was the 
corner-stone of American foreign policy, and if India was to 
find a niche for itself in the eyes of the US' strategic 
doctrine, it had to identify with American interests and 
priorities. But India was a new nation, a nation that did 
not share the ideological dilemma that was dividing Europe 
and the Western world. Even on the spread of communist 
influence in Asia, India's assessments differed from those 
of the United States. The rise to power of a People's 
government in China was, to Indians, a manifestation of 
nationalist pride and desires, not the long arm of 
international communism, spearheaded by its flag-bearer, the
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USSR. The Cold War remained a derivative of Western 
historical experience, a power struggle with whose reasons 
India could not identify. Having been a colony of the 
British empire for almost two centuries, India's foreign 
policy strove to achieve the two fundamental features of 
Asian nationalism and Asian pride in a world that was still 
defined from a Western perspective. Perhaps, the Indian 
government reasoned, non-alignment would help keep Asian 
nations away from the divisions of the Western world, 
providing newly independent nations with a vehicle with 
which to be heard and noticed on the global stage. "India 
could not be a mere hanger-on of any country or group of 
nations; her freedom and growth would make a vital 
difference to Asia and therefore the world," Nehru had 
written in 1944.42 "Far too long have we been petitioners 
in western courts and chancellories. That story must now 
belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet ... 
we do not intend to be playthings of others," the Indian 
Prime Minister said five months before independence.43 
Yes, India required American assistance in building the 
nation, and this was an important priority of the new 
government. But independence was a novelty, a dream that 
had kept the nationalist movement alive when all the odds 
were against its survival. Having won independence, the 
dreams of the nationalist movement were transformed into 
principles that were to determine policies, both at home and 
abroad. Under these circumstances, how was it possible for 
India to compromise on her dreams when victory seemed so
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near, and ally with the United States, when the specific 
foreign policy objectives of the two countries stemmed from 
different roots? Thus, non-alignment was viewed as 
"immoral" by Americans, and Indians, unable to understand 
America's pre-occupation with fighting the Soviet "threat", 
remained disillusioned over the lack of understanding shown 
to them.
KOREA AS A CATALYST
After Nehru's return from the United States, relations 
with the Truman Administration got worse than ever, but 
Nehru was careful to ensure that the stand-offishness of the 
US did not compel India to draw closer to the Soviet Union 
and destroy all ties with the Western world, for he was 
still very wary of Soviet behaviour.44 Ambassador 
Henderson, analysing the Indian government's attitude, wrote 
to Acheson:
... criticism expressed in the press or orally, of 
US government or people upon which Indians when 
irritated with the US are accustomed to dwell, 
including our treatment of American Negroes, our 
tendency to support colonialism and to strive for 
continued world supremacy of white peoples, our 
economic imperialism. ...45
The Truman Administration was becoming increasingly annoyed 
over the lack of understanding by the Indians of the strain 
America's commitment to Europe placed on its economy. 
Moreover, Indian insistence on no strings being attached to 
any assistance, particularly at a time when the US required 
support in Asia, precluded the feasibility of American tax
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money being provided without any tangible benefits. It was 
Acheson's opinion that friendly relations had to hinge on 
something more substantial and enduring than "millions of
• A fitons of wheat, dollar loans, or gifts." ° Henderson, 
however, was convinced that the only possible way for the 
two countries to grow closer was if America provided 
substantial economic aid, or if international communism 
began fresh adventures in India, scaring the Indian leaders 
into turning to the United States.47 Nothing else, it 
seemed, would prevent the current drift to change, with 
India continuing to denounce the United States, when 
irritated, publicising, in the process, its independent 
approach to foreign policy.
With the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, India 
and the United States were to find themselves locked in 
vigorous disagreement with each other, often representing 
ideological extremes. Much of this disagreement emanated 
from the chambers of the United Nations for the world to 
hear, but this contest of ideas and beliefs had its 
advantages too. It provided each country with an 
opportunity to size the other up, as well as understand the 
other's political beliefs, providing, in the long term, a 
more mature understanding of the other's foreign policy. 
India's diplomatic efforts at finding a solution to the 
crisis in Korea gained for itself greater understanding of 
non-alignment in the United States, but not before there had 
been considerable resentment expressed at the seemingly 
anti-American posture adopted by India with respect to the
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former*s position in Korea.
India's efforts to seat the People's Republic of China 
in the United Nations, and to convince the Soviet Union to 
return to the Security Council, provided it with a degree of 
credibility with the communist powers, thus making it 
possible for India to act as an arbiter on issues in Korea. 
Recognising this, the United States requested Nehru to warn 
China that it was against its interests to attack Formosa or 
get involved in the fighting in Korea, and not to react to
, , A O
American successes m  the peninsula. ° Nehru appealed to 
the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, to be patient and not 
react to events, but this appeal was thwarted by the Western 
powers who, believing that the Soviet Union and not China 
was the main opponent, crossed the 38th parallel, prompting 
Chinese "volunteers" to cross the Manchurian border.
It appeared, then, that the phase when Nehru could use 
his influence with China was over. The US was critical of 
India's repeated calls for restraint, and for mobilising 
support to gain admission for China into the United Nations
• • o A Qat a time of crisis. Nehru, speaking to Ambassador 
Henderson, explained that the Government of India did not 
believe that the Chinese were expansionist or had aggressive 
designs against other countries in Asia; China intervened in 
Korea because it believed the US wanted to use Korea as a 
base for subsequent invasions into China.50 The Western 
attitude was summed up by the British at the Commonwealth 
meeting in London: they believed that China and Russia were 
acting together; the strategy was for China to tie down
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large armies of the West in Korea while the Soviets would 
neutralize Germany and make advances in Europe.51
Whatever the' true facts surrounding the conflict in 
Korea may be, the important factor to this thesis is the 
continuing Indian inability to appreciate American security 
concerns in Asia. As Chester Bowles, an American Ambassador 
to India who was able to develop close relations with the 
Indian Prime Minister, explained to Nehru, India was harping 
too much on fighting nineteenth century imperialism which 
was already dead, or dying, while underestimating the power 
of the new Russian imperialism, led by the world communist 
movement.52 India*s ideological position was manifested 
further in an episode symbolic of the divergence in the 
countries* policies, the signing of the Japanese peace 
treaty in San Francisco in 1951. The treaty draft was 
circulated to some fifty-odd countries still technically at 
war with Japan, but India had two objections: the failure to 
recognise complete Japanese sovereignty (Ryuku and Bonin 
islands remained under American administration), and the 
failure to specify the return of Formosa to the People's 
Republic of China, thus making the treaty obviously 
unacceptable to the latter.53 India made its objections 
public by boycotting the ceremony in San Francisco, but, in 
retrospect, it appears naive of Nehru, the architect of 
India's foreign policy, to have expected the United States 
to compromise on a vital issue regarding its Far Eastern 
strategy. That, in essence, was the stumbling block in 
Indo-US relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
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In early 1952, Bowles and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt 
encouraged Nehru to resume active negotiations to break the 
impasse that had developed over issues in Korea. Responding 
to this, Nehru sent Krishna Menon to the UN to deal with the 
Korean question, eventually negotiating a settlement for the 
repatriation of prisoners by establishing a commission, led 
by an Indian, to act as a neutral arbiter. India1s 
diplomatic role earned for itself a greater appreciation and 
understanding of non-alignment in the United States, but, 
unfortunately, there was no similar appreciation by India of 
the US 1 interests.54
NAILING THE COFFIN
The Korean war served as a catalyst for the United 
States in defining a clear strategy to fight communist 
expansion in Asia. NSC-68 had recommended perimeter 
defense, and with the loss of China to communist domination, 
the Soviet "threat” now encroached along the perimeter of 
the Indian sub-continent. A policy statement by the 
National Security Council declared in 1951:
... the loss of China, the immediate threat to 
Indochina and the balance of Southeast Asia, the 
invasion of Tibet, and the reverses in Korea have 
greatly increased the significance to the US of the 
political strategic manpower and resource potential 
of the countries of South Asia and made it more 
important that this potential be marshalled on the 
side of the US. India, especially, and Pakistan as 
well, possess leaders having great prestige 
throughout the whole of Asia; the future support of 
these countries diplomatically and in the United 
Nations is of great importance; India in particular 
has certain strategic materials of importance to 
our national defense; . . . 4
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As mentioned earlier, the US was viewing India as an 
alternative to China as the main ally of the United States 
in Asia. However, concurrently, India stated its Asian 
objectives as mutual identity of purpose with China, 
vis-a-vis Asia, thus excluding India from the list of 
potential American allies in Asia. Ambassador Bowles, too, 
was of the opinion that nothing short of a dramatic change 
in the global political situation could force India to 
repudiate its "neutrality” on issues related to the Cold War 
and military alignments.55 Thus, there was, for the 
United States, only one course of action left to pursue: it 
could exert influence through "smaller, peripheral states," 
many of whom feared the power of China and India.56
Selig Harrison argues that the genesis of Pakistan*s 
military alliance lay in the ideas of a retired civil 
servant of the British Raj, Sir Olaf Caroe.57 Caroe, in 
his book, Wells of Power, argued that, with partition, India 
was no longer the logical base for Middle Eastern defense. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, lay well within the grouping of 
Southwestern Asia. It appears, however, somewhat naive to 
assume that the diplomatic and military policy makers in 
Washington were unable to judge for themselves Pakistan*s 
potential as an American ally, and had to rely instead on 
the advice of Caroe. Caroe, moreover, had been arguing that 
Pakistan, not India, was the logical base for both 
Southwestern Asia and the Sino-Soviet land mass.
M.S. Venkataramani, a scholar of Indo-US relations,
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provides substantial evidence to illustrate America * s early 
preference for India as a more favoured nation, including 
the fact that it was Nehru, not the Pakistani Prime 
Minister, who was first invited to Washington.58 I tend 
to agree with Heimsath and Mansingh's view that it was 
India*s commitment to non-alignment, re-inforced in the 
1950-53 period, that prompted the Americans to turn to 
'*smaller, peripheral states11 to act as a bulwark against 
communism. Further, numerous policy statements drawn up by 
the National Security Council and Armed Force's committees, 
quoted earlier, all explicitly stated preference for India 
as the "pivotal state" in resisting communism.
Thus, India's decision to reject the military 
alignments that characterized the bipolar world led to a US 
military alliance with Pakistan in 1954, the ground work for 
which began in the twilight years of the Truman 
Administration. Pakistan and India, however, shared an 
uneasy, antagonistic relationship, and the Government of 
India was apt to view any change in the regional balance of 
power as an act of hostility against it. This alliance 
brought forth two principal complaints from the Indian 
government. First, Pakistan's alliance with the United 
States fractured the geographic solidity of the non-aligned 
grouping of states, bringing the Cold War into what Nehru 
had hoped would be the "no war" area of Asia. By allying 
itself with Pakistan, the United States was bringing the 
Cold War to India's borders. Second, the US-Pakistani 
alliance resembled nineteenth century imperialism, where a
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relatively weak power accepted foreign military assistance 
to increase its own strength, gradually losing independence 
and providing a launching pad to spread alien influence into
RQ • .neighbouring countries.  ^ Nehru's second objection was, 
admittedly, an outdated analogy, but one that mirrored the 
fears of a nation still only seven years old. Apart from 
increasing the strategic vulnerability of India vis-a-vis 
Pakistan, the US Administration's decision to spawn military 
alliances on the Asian mainland was, in essence, the end of 
Nehru's vision of a "no war" Asia that could, through a 
loose grouping of Asian federations, voice distinctly Asian 
interests in the global arena. For the US, however, it was 
a guestion of filling the vaccuum on the Asian mainland. The 
land mass from Turkey to the Philippines, while on the 
southern flank of the communist area of influence, was 
unprotected by any Western-oriented forces. Apart from 
troops in Korea, there were no American troops on the entire 
Asian mainland.
President Dwight Eisenhower, attempting to explian
American security needs, wrote to Nehru in February 1954:
Our two Governments have agreed that our desires 
for peace are in accord. It has also been 
understood that if our interpretation of existing 
circumstances and our belief in how to achieve 
goals differ, it is the right and duty of sovereign 
nations to make their own decisions ... What we are 
proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to 
do, is not directed in any way against India. And 
I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any 
country, including Pakistan, is misused and 
directed against another in aggression I will 
undertake immediately, in accordance with my 
constitutional authority, appropriate action both 
within and without the UN to thwart such 
aggression.
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Despite Eisenhower's assurances, the Indian government's 
position towards the United States hardened. Recognising 
that there had always been substantial differences of 
opinion, this growing apart was essentially due to the 
strengthening of Pakistan militarily, and America's policy 
of collective defense through military alignments within 
India's sphere of strategic interest, South and Southeast
zr -i , ,
Asia. Later that year, US government officials were
j
concerned that relations had deteriorated sufficiently for
Eisenhower to intervene personally and invite the Indian
Prime Minister to Washington. Eventually, the President
wrote once again to Nehru:
What really counts is that there be common ground 
on which we can work out mutual problems and 
minimize differences. I believe the United States 
and India have such common ground in abundance. I 
do not consider that our differences in approach 
constitute any bar to growing friendship and 
cooperation between our two countries.
The damage, however, had been done. American security 
needs had clashed with Indian interests and objectives.
While the United States and India had never shared common 
strategic perceptions and needs, America's decision to build 
allies on the Asian mainland fractured India's Asian 
objectives. Of even greater damage, moreover, was the 
United States' decision to build Pakistan's military 
strength, an act that was considered positively unfriendly 
to India, given the antagonistic relationship between the 
two countries of the subcontinent.
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As is clearly evident from this analysis, the divergent 
global perspectives adopted by India and the United States 
were the result of different historical experiences and 
geographical locations, as well as the result of the 
difference in size between the two countries. Moulded as it 
was by the international strategic environment, since India 
could not share America*s global perspective or interests, 
there was little substance upon which to build close 
bilateral relations, despite common declared long term 
interests and objectives. Thus, the United States entered a 
military alliance with Pakistan, a development that was 
looked upon by India as encroaching upon her security 
interests.
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CHAPTER THREE
This second period, the years between 1961 and 1965, 
provides an interesting contrast to the first study. This 
chapter begins with an appreciation of John Kennedy's views 
on the Third World, in general, and India, in particular, 
highlighting the difference from the perspective of the 
Eisenhower Administration. This chapter also includes the 
effect China's attack on India in 1962 had on the latter's 
foreign policy, India's subsequent appeal to the United 
States, and the immediate years after the 1962 war.
JOHN F. KENNEDY
Senator John F. Kennedy's announcement, in early 19 60, 
that he had chosen Chester Bowles as his chief advisor on 
foreign policy ought, in retrospect, to have served as 
warning that, if elected President, a Kennedy 
Administration would herald a shift in foreign policy for 
Asia, in general, and India, in particular. Bowles had 
served as President Truman's Ambassador to New Delhi 
between 1951 and 1953, and was a vocal critic of the 
Eisenhower Administration's decision to include Pakistan in 
the newly created military alliances of SEATO and CENTO. 
Bowles had, for almost a decade, strongly and consistently
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opposed American policy in Asia which was based primarily, 
as he saw it, on military alliances with several rightist 
Asian governments.1 He had, as Ambassador to New Delhi, 
urged that India be recognised, along with Japan, as the 
United States' "bridge" to the East. This could be 
accomplished, he argued, by strong American support for 
India's five-year plan, winning India's friendship and 
understanding. "A dynamic, stable India and friendly 
Japan," he recommended, "can provide two crucial anchors 
for the whole vast territory from South Africa to the 
Aleutians. ... The balance of power and influence would be 
tipped sharply in our direction."
Even though Kennedy was deeply concerned with the 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, he 
did not attribute all mankind's troubles to this conflict. 
As Arthur Schlesinger noted, "in 1961 this was still rather
. . . oa novel viewpoint for an American President."*^ Holding 
the view that the battle for Europe, except for Berlin, had 
essentially been won by the end of the 1940s, Kennedy was 
of the opinion that the battleground between democracy and 
communism had shifted to the Third World countries of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.4 This, however, was contrary 
to the policy he inherited as President, a policy deeply 
entrenched in the world of government and bureaucracy.
There had been a tendency in the years after the 
Second World War, including the 1950s, to view the world as 
neatly divided in the ideological conflict between America 
and the Soviet Union. Countries that did not fit into the
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two categories of "communist” and "free world" were
regarded as anomolies in a highly ideological planet. John
Foster Dulles, Eisenhower*s Secretary of State, had aspired
to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of
states aligned with the United States, with the hope that
this would discourage Soviet and Chinese attacks and
further communist advances.5 To achieve this Dulles had
attempted to recruit the Third World nations of Asia to
align themselves with the United States through treaties
and unilateral declarations— SEATO, CENTO, bilateral
security pacts with South Korea and Taiwan, and
Congressional resolutions on Taiwan and the Middle East.
Countries like India, however, which chose to be neutral
and removed from the ideological crusade of the times, were
viewed as "immoral." In an ideological struggle as intense
as the Cold War, there was, for Dulles, no room for middle
ground. Neutrality, to Dulles, was "an immoral and
short-sighted conception.1,6 As Schlesinger, summing up
Dulles* creed, wrote:
If they declined to ally themselves to the United 
States or went their own way in the United Nations 
or indulged in tirades against the west or engaged 
in social revolution, it was due to inherent moral 
weakness compounded by the unsleeping activities 
of the minions of a Communist Satan.
There was, in other words, an inherent belief in the 
American government that those countries who were not with 
us were necessarily against us.
Kennedy, on the other hand, was of the view that 
neutral nations were as naturally indifferent to the
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"moral” issues of the Cold War as the United States had
been to political developments in Europe at a comparable
stage of growth. As he said in 1959:
The desire to be independent and free carries with 
it the desire not to become engaged as a satellite 
of the Soviet Union or too closely allied to the 
United States. We have to live with that, and if 
neutrality is the result of concentrating on 
internal problems, raising the standard of living 
of the people and so on, particularly in the 
under-developed countries, I would accept that. 
It's part of our own history for over a hundred 
years.8
Thus, while Dulles opposed neutrality and regarded neutral 
nations as essentially committed to the "other" side, 
Kennedy, by making national independence the crucial issue 
in his foreign policy for the Third World, encouraged 
neutral Third World countries to be benevolent towards the 
United States because of their common stake in resisting 
the threat of communist totalitarianism.
India, more specifically, was regarded by Kennedy as 
"the key area" in Asia, a country that, of all neutral 
nations, he was most interested in. Kennedy had visited 
India with his brother Robert in 1951, and believed that 
the struggle between India and China for the economic and 
political leadership of the East would determine the future 
of Asia. It is interesting to note, at this point, how 
Kennedy's views on India co-incided with those of another 
Democratic politician, Bowles. Whilst still a Senator, 
Kennedy, with Bowles in the House of Representatives, had 
introduced a resolution in Congress calling for a joint 
European-American financial effort to support India's
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five-year economic plan. Introducing the resolution, he 
said, "If China succeeds and India fails, the 
economic-development balance will shift against us." 
Regarding India's commitment to its policy of 
non-alignment, he went on to say, "Let us remember that our 
nation also during the period of its formative growth 
adopted a policy of noninvolvement in the great 
international controversies of the nineteenth century."9 
Thus, because of Kennedy's long standing interest in
and support for India, his election as President was met
• • . . .  . i nwith considerable optimism m  India. Moreover,
Kennedy's choices of Bowles as his Undersecretary of State 
and John Kenneth Galbraith as Ambassador to India 
undoubtedly served as an indication of the importance 
President Kennedy placed on relations with India. 
Schlesinger wrote that "in sending Galbraith as his 
ambassador to New Delhi, Kennedy deliberately chose a man 
who could be depended upon to bring to Indian problems his 
own mixture of sympathy and irony."11
KENNEDY'S WORST VISIT. 1961
On assuming his duties as Ambassador to New Delhi, 
Galbraith felt the best way of erasing memories of Dulles' 
isolation of India was to expose the Indian Prime Minister 
to the new President.12 Although unhappy at the Bay of 
Pigs adventure, the two governments had worked in tandem in 
the Congo,13 and Nehru, at Kennedy's request, had 
intervened with Hanoi and Moscow to arrange a cease-fire in
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Laos.14 Kennedy was extremely grateful for India’s 
assistance in Laos, and even committed himself to assist 
India's economic development. Nehru appreciated Kennedy's 
goodwill and stated in Parliament that the new American 
Administration was more friendly to India than its 
predecessor had been.
However, despite general acceptance by the two leaders 
that relations between the two countries were on the 
threshold of a major breakthrough, Nehru's visit to the 
United States in November 1961 was not a success. Arthur 
Schlesinger guotes the President describing the visit as "a
disaster ... the worst head-of-state visit I have
1 6 •had."xo The American assessment was that Nehru was a 
tired old man who had stayed around too long.17 The 
Indian delegation, on the other hand, was in something of a 
dilemma. Kennedy had won the election by an extremely 
narrow margin and appeared insecure in his handling of 
power. The Indian guests, moreover, were aware of 
differences between the White House and State Department 
vis-a-vis India, and were troubled by the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco.18
The two leaders talked about Laos, Vietnam, Kashmir, 
the growing Sino-Indian border problem, and Pakistan, and 
Galbraith records the meetings as a monologue by the 
President as the Prime Minister simply did not respond on 
most issues.19 While Nehru had already done what he had 
been asked to do to secure Laotian neutrality and 
independence, he did not want to join the American effort
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in finding a solution in Vietnam. Kennedy had earlier 
indicated to M.C. Chagla, the retiring Indian Ambassador to 
Washington, that he would have liked India to assume a 
position of leadership in Southeast Asia against China, and 
that he was willing to accept non-alignment of the area if 
that was the outcome of Indian leadership.20 In the 
United States, Kennedy once again pressed Nehru to help in 
finding a solution for Vietnam, with methods ranging from 
an approach by Nehru to Ho Chi Minh, a UN observer corps, a 
stronger International Control Commission, and acceptance 
of Indian leadership in establishing a neutral belt across
, pi ,
Southeast Asia. x Apart from recommending that President 
Diem of South Vietnam be urged to reform his 
administration, the Indian delegation refused to even 
consider any of the other proposals. Nehru refused to 
consider the sponsorship of a neutral Southeast Asia, for 
it amounted to a virtual alliance, and the Indian team did 
not think that any initiative was possible apart from the 
proper working of the International Control Commission 
under the Geneva Accords of 1954.22 While there is 
confusion as to the reasons for Nehru's unusual reticence, 
his reluctance to be drawn into any effort in Vietnam is 
justified by what we now know. During the course of these 
discussions in the United States, plans to send a modest 
8,000-man American military force were being drawn up at 
the State Department.23
It is interesting to analyse, at this stage, why 
Nehru's visit to the United States in 1961 is acknowledged
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by all to have been a complete failure, particularly in 
light of the expectations that a meeting between the two 
leaders had begun to evoke in the minds of others.
Kennedy's views on India's role in Asia have already been 
discussed. Nehru, it has also been noted, had been 
impressed by Kennedy's commitment to India's economic 
development as a Senator, and had publicly acknowledged the 
thawing of Indo-US relations in the early months of the new 
Democratic Administration. It is evident from the 
narrative of the talks between the two, described above, 
that the stalemate appeared to arise over Southeast Asia. 
Galbraith recorded that Nehru only seemed interested when 
the talks focussed upon India's immediate geographic 
vicinity.24 This is particularly intriguing when viewed 
in the context of Nehru's views of Southeast Asia in the 
early 1950s, which included his vision of an Asian 
federation and no-war area devoid of Western colonial and 
military presence.
It is obvious that Kennedy was agitated to find a 
solution short of sending American military personnel to 
Vietnam, and while Nehru responded negatively to all the 
American suggestions on Vietnam, he continually re-iterated 
that the US should not send troops to the area.25 But 
the Americans required a realistic alternative, and this 
Nehru refrained from providing. The practicality and 
effectiveness of a stronger International Control 
Commission or a neutral belt across Southeast Asia is not 
the subject of this thesis. The intriguing question is why
62
Nehru rejected the offer to sponsor such a solution, 
knowing that an effort, even if a failure, would win 
greater American goodwill and assistance for India, as 
evidenced by the results of his diplomatic role in Laos.
Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and Gamal Nasser of Egypt 
had, earlier in 1961, been keen to convene a conference of 
all non-aligned states. Nehru felt that the conference, 
whose purpose was to create a bloc or at least a platform 
of like minded nations, would damage the concept of 
non-alignment. The essence of non-alignment was the 
retention of freedom from pre-commitment; the creation of a 
third bloc, a non-aligned one, contradicted this purpose. 
Non-alignment, to Nehru, meant more than merely standing 
aloof from the Soviet Union and the Western powers; it 
included non-alignment with other countries as well.26 
Nehru realised, however, that he could not stay away from 
the meeting at Belgrade, but made his hesitation known and 
guided the conference to be as broad based in its policies 
and priorities as possible.
Visiting the United States a month after Belgrade, 
Nehru possibly had the same hesitation in mind when he 
opposed Indian leadership of a neutral Southeast Asia 
because it virtually amounted to another military 
alliance. While the specific reason that prompted Nehru's 
reluctance is unclear, I can only presume his hesitation 
stemmed from the same ideological reasoning that 
characterized his response to Nasser and Tito.
Be that as it may, Nehru, undoubtedly aware of the
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strategic value of Southeast Asia to the United States,
described in the previous chapter, allowed an opportunity
for the two countries to work in tandem in an area of
geo-strategic value, to pass. Although relations between
the United States and India were not harmed by Nehru1s
reluctance to be drawn into closer global contact between
the two countries, Kennedy1s perceptions of India1s
potential greatness were altered.
Though Kennedy retained his belief in the 
necessity of helping India achieve its economic 
goals, he rather gave up hope, after seeing Nehru, 
that India would be in the next years a great 
affirmative force in the world or even in South 
Asia.27
SINO-INDIAN BORDER WAR. 1962
While India and China had been locked in dispute over 
their common Himalayan border since the early 1950s,28 
the Chinese attack on the 20 October, 1962, caught the 
world unprepared for any major fighting. Coinciding with 
the crisis over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, any 
anticipation that a bilateral matter would develop into a 
world crisis was soon shattered. However, the day after 
the Chinese attacked, the State Department declared that 
the United States "was shocked at the violent and 
aggressive action of the Chinese communists against India," 
and that any Indian request for aid "would be considered 
sympathetically.1,29
The Soviet Union, preoccupied with events in Cuba, was 
reluctant to get involved, but assumed a pro-Chinese 
stance. Similarly, leaders of other non-aligned nations,
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with the exception of Tito and Nasser, were guarded in 
their responses. The general reaction of other nations 
shocked Nehru out of the complacence he had assumed with 
the attainment of independence, even making him skeptical 
about the faith he had placed in the inherent goodwill of 
nations and the superiority of the ways of peace.30 
These developments, coupled with a succession of quick 
reverses suffered by Indian troops and the lack of
equipment, forced India to turn to any quarter to obtain
31arms.
President Kennedy’s offer of aid was communicated by 
Galbraith to Nehru on 29 October, an offer that was 
promptly accepted. That Nehru was sensitive to the 
political implications of this act is evident from two 
episodes. Speaking to Galbraith, Nehru mentioned that 
while India did indeed require military aid, he hoped this 
did not mean a military alliance between the United States 
and India.32 Similarly, in delivering Nehru’s first 
letter to Kennedy, Ambassador B.K. Nehru expressed the hope 
that Kennedy would offer "support" instead of "military 
assistance" on the basis of "sympathy" instead of an 
"alliance."33 While it is evident that Nehru was 
clinging to his ideological position of non-alignment at a 
time of crisis, it was also a prudent political move. He 
did not want to irritate the Soviets, who realised that 
military assistance from the United States was inevitable, 
as he expected them to revert to their earlier attitude of 
partiality to India once the Cuban crisis was
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resolved.34 To America's eternal credit in Indian eyes, 
though short lived as subsequent events proved, Kennedy 
offered "support out of sympathy."
That America responded promptly to the Indian plea is 
evident from the fact that the first load of military 
equipment arrived in India merely four days after the 
request was made.35 The initial airlift, worth several 
million dollars, was extended to India under the terms of 
the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (section 503), which 
empowered the President to draw upon existing stocks of US 
weapons, in special situations, without prior Congressional 
approval. This airlift— essentialy of mobile weapons— was 
completed on the 12 November.
Although the Prime Minister had warned the nation to 
be prepared for further reverses, and the army instructed 
to fight on terrain that was favourable to them and not 
advantageous to the Chinese— as in the higher slopes of the 
Himalayas— even Nehru was not ready for the rout that was 
to follow. On 17 November, the Indian commander of the 
eastern sector sent a desperate message that the 
superiority of the Chinese was so great that foreign troops 
should be asked to come to India's aid. ° Within two 
days, an advance to Leh in the west and the loss of the 
entire northeast appeared inevitable, with the likelihood 
that the Chinese would advance into the Indian plains.
The magnitude of the Chinese break-through resulted in 
a state of panic and shock at all levels of Indian 
decision-making. Without apparently consulting any of his
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cabinet colleagues, apart from the bureaucratic chief of
the Foreign Office, M.J. Desai,37 Nehru sent Kennedy two
letters on 19 November. Describing the situation as
"really desperate," the Indian Prime Minister
requested the immediate despatch of a minimum of 
twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather 
fighters and the setting up of radar 
communications. American personnel would have to 
man these fighters and installations and protect 
Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till 
Indian personnel had been trained. If possible, 
the United States should also send planes flown by 
American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force 
in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air 
space; but aerial action by India elsewhere would 
be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. 
Nehru also asked for two B-47 bomber squadrons to 
enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air 
fields? but to learn to fly these planes Indian 
pilots and technicians would be sent immediately 
for training in the United States. All such 
assistance and equipment would be utilised solely 
against the Chinese.39
However, the United States lifted the naval blockade 
of Cuba on 20 November, and the Chinese announced a 
unilateral cease-fire on the 21st, with a withdrawal north 
of the McMahon Line in the east and the "line of actual 
control" in other sectors to follow in ten days.
The effect of Nehru's atypical response in requesting 
direct American participation to resist the Chinese attack 
was blunted by the Chinese decision to announce a 
unilateral cease-fire two days after the request was made. 
Ironically, it was, therefore, the Chinese who made it 
possible for India to retain, technically at least, its 
hallowed policy of non-alignment. While critics can argue 
that the request did, in essence, end any claims to
67
non-alignment, the fact remains that Nehru*s potentially 
momentous decision was never implemented, allowing India to 
defend the legitimacy of its non-alignment.
Galbraith records that the United States did take the 
Indian plea for "military association" very seriously. 
Before the Chinese announcement of a cease-fire came 
through later that night, Kennedy sent Galbraith a message 
on 21 November indicating that he was prepared to help and 
was sending a high-level mission to "assess the needs of 
the Indians." The message also contained the promise of 
further equipment for the Indian defense effort, and the 
proposal of three American teams to help run the war.4®
The day after the war ended, a large mission arrived in New 
Delhi from Washington, headed by Averell Harriman. It is 
thus perfectly apparent that, although Nehru*s request for 
military association was never implemented or completely 
tested, the Kennedy Administration was actively considering 
the Indian plea. Even Michael Brecher notes that the US 
Government was in the process of drafting a favourable 
reply to Nehru’s request when the cease-fire was 
announced.41
The question of greatest relevance to this thesis is 
why the United States reacted so favourably to India’s 
defense needs, particularly when it was concurrently 
occupied by a more critical issue, the Cuban missile 
crisis. Nations do not offer foreign aid or conduct their 
international relations for purely altruistic reasons, and 
the United States was no exception.
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The India-China border war of 1962 provided the United 
States with a rare opportunity to further its political 
aims in a region of strategic importance. American 
relations with China had not improved since 1949, and 
India1s need for assistance provided the Kennedy 
Administration with an opportunity to consolidate America*s 
position in the area. Coming to India's aid would provide 
greater influence over India, as well as a more pro-Western 
version of non-alignment. Moreover, it provided the United 
States with a lever to pressure India to negotiate a 
settlement over Kashmir, leading to greater Indo-Pakistani 
cooperation with Western forces in facing the northern 
communist bastion.
Galbraith noted in his diary that, on the evening of
2 0 November, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, sent him a long
message in response to Nehru's letter of the 19th. It
asked several questions on pointedly political issues:
India's attitude to Pakistan, problems of communism in
South Asia, and the potential roles of the Commonwealth and
United Nations in brokering a solution for Kashmir.42
Even the Harriman Mission, the most visible expression of
American commitment to India in 1962, recorded:
Part of our mission was merely to demonstrate 
United States support for India and so to send the 
Chinese Communists a signal of deterrence.... But 
beyond this emergency, further Chinese behavior 
would depend on whether or not an effective 
deterrent could be created in the sub-continent 
... how India and Pakistan each assessed the 
nature of the threat from Communist China ... and 
whether they were willing to modify their 
hostility toward each other.... The only effective
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defense of the sub-continent against such a threat 
would be a joint defense by both India and 
Pakistan standing together.43
Thus, while America's decision to assist India in 1962 
can be viewed in the general context of President Kennedy's 
policy of reversing Dulles' isolation of India by building 
closer bilateral relations, the 1962 border war also 
provided the Kennedy Administration with the means whereby 
a larger American political objective could be 
accomplished, that of opposing the communist countries to 
India's immediate north. Moreover, this could be achieved 
in a variety of ways. By reacting promptly to India's 
needs, the United States could win the confidence of 
India's political elite and the necessary influence to 
result in changes that would make Indian foreign policy 
more sympathetic to the American view of the world.44 
Or, as Galbraith noted, the political benefits of military 
aid and an air defense pact had the ingredients of major 
implications for long-term Indo-American relations.45
However, the "joint defense of the sub-continent," 
envisaged by the Harriman Mission, hinged on the issue of 
settling the dispute over Kashmir between India and 
Pakistan. It is easy to understand why the United States 
required this political development before commiting itself 
to an effective defense of the subcontinent against Chinese 
attacks: military assistance would have to be directed 
against the Communist threat, not frittered away in 
settling old scores. But when the Chinese attacked India
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in October 1962, Pakistan made no secret of its bias 
against India and support for China. Dependent on the
United States and Britain for military assistance, India 
could not refuse to negotiate with Pakistan; Harriman told 
Nehru that public opinion in his country would only favour 
generous support to India if it were linked with a 
settlement on Kashmir.47 Nehru, welcoming Bowles on his 
return to India in 1963, noted that he had been puzzled by 
the United States' decision to pressure India to compromise 
on Kashmir at a time when Pakistan's support of China made 
such a situation politically impossible, the only action by 
the United States in 1962 that piqued an otherwise grateful 
Indian Government.
LOST OPPORTUNITIES
Following India's debacle in the war with China, and 
given prospects of a long phase of Chinese hostility, 
India's military requirements had to be given a more 
realistic dimension. Its military unpreparedness, and the 
consequent dependence on military assistance from the 
United States, made Nehru more willing than at any previous 
stage to fit India into the pattern of American policy, an 
adjustment that was necessary if India hoped to capitalise 
on American assistance.
Expecting the resumption of a Chinese attack somewhere 
in the forseeable future, Nehru's government suggested an 
agreement whereby India would commit its tactical aircraft 
to engage the invading Chinese while the United States
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would undertake the defense of Indian cities.48 Although 
Ambassador Galbraith was eager to take the opportunity "by 
the ears," as it provided an "economical basis for a 
continuing relationship," Washington wanted the
• A QCommonwealth to take the lead in any such scheme. At 
the Nassau meeting in December 1962 between Prime Minister 
Macmillian of the United Kingdom and President Kennedy, the 
British proved reluctant to undertake the lead, allowing "a 
great opportunity to bring India into much closer working 
asssociation with the western community, an opportunity 
sensed only by the President, [Philip] Talbot and myself 
[Galbraith]," to pass.50
Thus, an opportunity where the Indian Government was 
prepared to barter its non-alignment for a military 
relationship with the United States came to nought. Within 
a few months, possibly as the result of a decrease in the 
level of anti-Chinese hysteria in India, Nehru began to 
dismiss suggestions of an American 'air umbrella.'51 He 
wanted, instead, United States help in building India's 
military forces to be able to defend the nation, and he 
requested military assistance worth $500 million over a 
period of five years. Although the State and Defense 
Departments were reluctant to upset their Pakistani allies, 
Kennedy privately conceded to Bowles, by now appointed 
Ambassador to New Delhi, that he supported the request, and 
instructed Bowles to explore Indian attitudes and 
needs.52
On arriving in India in the summer of 1963, Bowles met
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with Nehru to follow up on the Prime Minister*s request. 
Directing Bowles to defense officials, Nehru indicated that 
India now required forces strong enough to deter two 
aggressive neighbours, Pakistan and China. By the autumn 
of that year, a tentative agreement had been worked out at 
the cost of $75 million a year for five years. Having 
negotiated a tentative agreement with the Indians, Bowles 
suggested that the United States would welcome India * s 
political cooperation in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian 
nations, an offer Nehru had rejected in 1961 in Washington, 
but which he now promptly accepted.53
Knowing that he had the President's support, and armed 
with both a tentative agreement and Nehru's surprising 
willingness to help the American position in Southeast 
Asia, Bowles arrived in the United States in mid-November. 
On reporting to the President, Kennedy informed Bowles that 
he would support the proposal regardless of the bureaucrats 
at the State and Defense Departments who were anxious not 
to annoy Pakistan, and scheduled a meeting of the National 
Security Council for 26 November, 1963.54 Four days 
before the scheduled meeting was to have taken place, 
President Kennedy was assassinated.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, quite naturally, was 
anxious to view the agreement from his own perspective, and 
asked for the meeting to be postponed. By May 1964, 
another tentative agreement had been reached, and Bowles 
was followed to Washington by Indian Defense Minister 
Chavan and a team of officials to tie up the loose ends.
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After two weeks of negotiations, an agreement satisfactory 
to India, and agreed to by the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, had been reached, and a meeting at the White House 
set for 28 May. On 27 May, Prime Minister Nehru passed 
away in India.
Although Ambassador Bowles recommended that this was 
an important time to demonstrate American support for 
India, and the President's Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, agreed, officials at the State and 
Defense Departments wanted to watch political developments 
in India till "the dust ha[d] a chance to settle." Knowing 
that Indian officials were anxious to sign an agreement 
with the United States but were prepared to take advantage 
of a Soviet offer to provide similar military hardware, 
Bowles urged Washington to act soon, but to no avail.55 
In mid-August 1964, the same Indian defense team that had 
visited Washington under Chavan, left for Moscow. They 
returned two weeks later with everything they had asked 
for, and more.
Even though Galbraith's and Bowles' recommendations 
were never adopted by Washington, the period of aborted 
negotiations between the two countries serves as an 
intereesting back-drop for a commentary on Indo-US 
relations during the Kennedy years.
John Kennedy entered the White House with views on the 
the Third World and India that fundamentally differed from 
those of his immediate two predecessors. Indo-US relations 
had been given form and shape in the Truman and Eisenhower
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administrations under the influence of Cold War rhetoric. 
The Kennedy Administration promised to break new ground and 
change the direction of these relations, in keeping with 
the time. His tenure, more importantly, witnessed an 
important milestone in Indian foreign policy, the Chinese 
attack on India, a period when the Indian Government was 
prepared to adjust its perceptions of global events to fit 
in with American strategic evaluations. However, when 
viewed with the benefit of over twenty years of hindsight, 
the promise and intentions of the Kennedy years, with 
respect to Indo-US relations, remained just that; they 
failed to significantly alter Indo-US relations in a manner 
that would serve as a legacy upon which future generations 
could build. The key question is why?
China's attack on India in 1962 and the growing 
Sino-Soviet rift opened avenues for a fundamental and 
sweeping shift in global politics in Asia. When Dulles had 
sought to build American allies against China and the 
Soviet Union on the Asian mainland, India chose to identify 
its Asian objectives as being in congruence with those of 
China. Now that China had humiliated India and proved that 
it was "one head taller than India imagined herself to be," 
India had to take into account China's threat that it "had 
taught India a lesson and, if necessary, would teach her a 
lesson again and again."56 Moreover, the Chinese attack 
and humiliation of India firmly proved Nehru's premise of 
non-alignment allowing the nation to focus primarily on her 
economic growth as being misguided, a factor that demanded
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immediate changes in India's foreign policy thinking.
Given the urgency of India's dilemma, Nehru was prepared to 
do anything to alleviate the potential disasters of another 
Chinese attack, even if it meant compromising on his 
fiercly independent view of the world.
Although Nehru's request for military association with 
the United States was negated by the Chinese announcement 
of a cease-fire, any significant development of the Indian 
armed forces required considerable support by the United 
States. India, moreover, had the advantage, it seemed, of 
two successive American ambassadors who believed it was 
India, not Pakistan, that the US ought to cultivate as its 
main Asian ally,57 and an American President who regarded 
the future of Asia as being determined by the competition 
between India and China.58 With old relations coming 
unstuck (Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian) in a fashion that fitted 
in with American interests, the prospects of stronger 
American influence in Asia looked promising. Thus, all the 
ingredients for a resulting shift in relations were 
satisfied, with only a formal ratification necessary to 
begin the institutionalization of these changes.
While the death of two key actors at a time when the 
curtain was ready to rise can be attributed to fate, there 
is, to my mind, another equally important factor that 
prevented an agreement from being signed.
As mentioned earlier, Indo-US relations took both form 
and shape in the years of the Cold War, a period that was 
dominated by ideological rhetoric and dogma that
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momentarily blinded principal actors from both countries 
from allowing a more mature appreciation of the other*s 
attitudes, beliefs and concerns. Having ignored these 
factors in the 1950s, bureaucrats in the 1960s had to take 
into account the United States* principal ally in South 
Asia, Pakistan, an ally that the United States was bound to 
by treaty commitments and obligations. Thus, any dramatic 
change in American policy in South Asia had to consider the 
likely effects on US-Pakistani relations, a potentially 
necessary casualty given the uneasy antagonistic 
relationship India and Pakistan shared.
Thus, when I argue that a perceptible change in 
Indo-US relations had to be “institutionalized” by a formal 
ratification in the form of a treaty that legitimized the 
warming of relations, it is the shadow of the Cold War that 
I have in mind. It is the legacy of this rhetoric, this 
dogma, that proved to be the spoke in the wheels when an 
opportunity for changed surfaced in 1962-63, a legacy to 
which bureaucrats of the State and Defense Departments 
referred frequently when arguing that a treaty with India 
would hurt relations with Pakistan, the United States* main 
ally in South Asia.
INDO-PAKISTAN WAR. 1965
1965 was a particularly bad year for Indo-American 
relations. Having lost the initiative for increased 
assistance to India to the Soviets in 1964, President 
Johnson invited Prime Minister Shastri to visit Washington
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in the spring of 1965. Soon after the date had been 
finalised by the two governments, Johnson, because of his 
hectic schedule, withdrew the invitation, an action that 
was taken as an "insult” in New Delhi. Piqued by the 
American decision, Shastri's subsequent comment that the 
bombing of North Vietnam was unlikely to bring peace was 
played up by the press in both India and the United 
States. Responding to this minor, though irritating, 
development, Washington reacted by dragging its feet over 
the proposed shipment of American wheat to meet Indian 
shortages caused by the failure of the monsoons.59
Just when it appeared that relations between the two 
countries could sink no lower in one year, Pakistan 
attacked the Indian positions in the Kashmir valley in 
August 1965. Although the United States was not directly 
involved in the war or responsible for Pakistan's decision, 
Pakistan, as a member of both SEATO and CENTO, was armed 
with American equipment, a fear that India had lived with 
since 1954. As Bowles wrote, "Over and over again it was 
pointed out to me that every Indian casualty had been 
caused by an American bullet, an American shell or an 
American hand grenade."60
Eleven years had elapsed since President Eisenhower's 
assurance that he would take "appropriate action" if US 
arms were ever used against India, and Nehru, in reply, had 
doubted the practicality of Eisenhower's assurances. To 
make matters even worse, when UN observers at the 
cease-fire line in Kashmir reported to the Secretary
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General that it was Pakistan which had committed the 
aggression, high officials at the UN were convinced that 
publicizing the report would push Pakistan into a corner
.  .  > . i . • •and make negotiations impossible. Disappointed with 
the UN's failure to publish this report, Indian troops 
launched a counter-attack aimed towards Lahore, West 
Pakistan's second largest city, to take the pressure off 
the Kashmir front, thus spreading the war along the 
India-West Pakistan border.
Although India had continually opposed the transfer of 
American arms to Pakistan because it breached the "no war" 
area of South Asia and brought the Cold War to India's 
borders, private Indian fears focussed upon the immediate 
threat a militarily supported Pakistan posed to India's 
position in the sub-continent. While the United States had 
justified arms transfers as being directed against 
communist China— ignoring the development that, by the 
mid-1960s, Pakistan had turned to China as its principal 
ally— Indian officials hoped Pakistan's use of US equipment 
to attack India would remove the wool from American eyes 
and make them realise the folly of pursuing their global 
policies in the face of regional realities.
The possibility of losing its intelligence base in 
Peshawar, Pakistan, still dominated American policy for 
South Asia, however.62 The United States had, for almost 
a decade, used Peshawar as the launching base for its U-2 
intelligence flights over the Soviet Union and China, the 
principal reason why officials at the State and Defense
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Departments were hesitant to sanction an arms agreement 
with India in 1963-64. They suspected Pakistan would deny 
America access to the Peshawar base in the event of an 
Indo-US agreement. Thus, although the US Ambassador in 
Pakistan had privately "protested" against the Pakistani 
aggression with American equipment, when Pakistan publicly 
denied that any such protest had been made, Washington 
remained silent,63 reinforcing the Indian attitude that 
New Delhi had been "double-crossed" by the United States.
As is evident, even though the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1965 was a regional bilateral issue, its ramifications 
transcended the sub-continent and made the United States a 
favourite whipping boy for India. Thus, when the Johnson 
Administration, exasperated with the dynamics of regional 
politics, suspended all military aid to both Pakistan and 
India in 1965, its effects had already been negated, in 
Indian eyes, by the fact that Pakistan had attacked with 
American weapons, the United Nations, of which the Western 
powers had considerable control, refused to declare 
Pakistan the "aggressor," and that there was no official 
outrage over Pakistan's misuse of American equipment. 
Military aid to Pakistan had been suspended, but this 
policy applied to India too. And, in the ultimate 
analysis, Nehru's skepticism of Eisenhower's asssurances 
had been proven correct, showing up the folly of US 
strategic policy in South Asia.
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CHAPTER FOUR
In this examination of the final period, 1969-72, I 
will focus upon the attitudes that characterized Mrs. 
Gandhi's and Richard Nixon's views of each other, and then 
move on to study the effects of the East Pakistan crisis of 
1971.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
When the Nixon Administration entered office in 
January 1969, American foreign policy for the Indian 
sub-continent sought to build relations with both India and 
Pakistan. President Johnson had, in 1967, announced a new 
arms policy for the sub-continent. Exasperated with the 
dynamics of Indo-Pakistani antagonism, the Johnson 
Administration came to the conclusion that the United 
States had few direct interests in South Asia and should 
not have to make a choice between India and Pakistan; both 
countries were to be treated identically.1 American 
grants of military equipment to both countries were 
terminated and US military missions were withdrawn.
Further, the Johnson Administration decided that all 
subsequent requests for military equipment were to be 
treated on a case-by-case basis, with the intention of
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improving relations with both India and Pakistan.
By the time President Nixon announced the approval of 
a "one-time exception" sale of military equipment to 
Pakistan in the summer of 1970, a number of unseen, though 
important, forces had begun to change the dynamics of 
Indo-US relations, the effects of which were not recognised 
till much later.
In India, Indira Gandhi, Nehru*s daughter, succeeded 
Lai Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister in 1966. Unlike her 
father, Mrs. Gandhi was a pragmatist, an individual 
uncommitted to the idealistic principles that had 
determined the focus of India’s foreign poilcy in the years 
after independence. In the words of Surjit Mansingh, "it 
was enough for her to accept facts, adjust to them, and 
seek to use them to advantage; she did not project 
preconceived theories on the phenomenal world."2 Mrs. 
Gandhi's main contribution to India's foreign policy was, 
to my mind, her recognition of the use of power as a 
crucial determinant in international relations. Unlike her 
predecessors, Mrs. Gandhi was more concerned with the 
tangible rather than moral face of foreign relations, a 
fact that was revealed in her handling of the Indo-Pakistan 
crisis of 1971.
Richard Nixon entered the White House with many 
preconceived notions about India. Unlike his Democratic 
predecessors, he was less susceptible to Indian claims of 
moral leadership, and regarded his predecessors' 
obsequiousness towards India as a prime example of "liberal
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softheadedness.1,3 Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi, moreover, 
shared an extremely fractious personal relationship. Henry 
Kissinger, Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
records that Nixon's comments after meetings with Mrs. 
Gandhi "were not always printable," and Christopher Van 
Hollen, Nixon's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near and South Asian Affairs, notes that, "when Mrs. 
Gandhi's actions ran counter to White House desires,
Nixon's customary sobriquet of 'that bitch' was replaced by 
more unprintable epithets."4
Pakistan, concurrently, was a country for which Nixon 
had special regard. It was one of the few countries where 
Nixon had been received with respect when he was out of 
office.
... the bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan 
were more congenial to him [Nixon] than the 
complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of 
India.5
When President Yahya Khan visited Washington in October 
1970, Nixon assured him that "nobody has occupied the White 
House who is friendlier to Pakistan."6
It is important to clarify these attitudes because 
they were among the guiding lights that determined American 
policies for the sub-continent during the India-Pakistan 
crisis of 1971, the subject of this chapter.
THE GENESIS OF THE CRISIS
It was virtually impossible to anticipate the 
explosive events of March 1971. On succeeding Ayub Khan as
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President of Pakistan in 1969, General Yahya Khan publicly 
pledged the transfer of power to a civilian government 
elected on the basis of direct adult franchise. Since this 
chapter focusses upon the fall-out from the Pakistani 
general elections of 1970, I will sketch an outline of the 
crisis as it evolved.
In the intense political campaign of 1969-70, the 
Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), 
campaigning on a six-point platform of regional autonomy 
for East Pakistan, won 167 out of the 169 seats it 
contested in the East, but made no impact on the West. 
Similarly, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), under 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, emerged in a dominant position in the 
West, winning 81 of the 138 seats allotted to West 
Pakistan. The PPP did not field any candidates in East 
Pakistan. Thus, according to the election results, the 
Awami League won a majority of the 313 seats in the 
National Assembly, giving Mujib the right to form a new 
government as Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Mujib refused to soften the Awami League's demand of 
greater regional autonomy for East Pakistan which would 
leave the central government with responsibility only in 
the fields of foreign policy and defense. Bhutto, on the 
other hand, was the advocate of a strong central 
government, and, viewing the Awami demand as tantamount to 
a threat of secession, he threatened to boycott any session 
of the National Assembly called before he reached a 
political understanding with Mujib. Yahya, caught in the
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stalemate, did not know what to do. Although he did not 
hold Bhutto in very high esteem, he opposed the 
quasi-independence of the East demanded by Mujib.
Expecting the two leaders to iron out their differences, 
Yahya postponed the convening of the National Assembly, a 
move that antagonised the East. Hoping that a deadline 
would force the two political rivals to compromise, Yahya 
re-scheduled the National Assembly for 25 March, 1971.
In a final attempt to resolve the constitutional 
crisis, Yahya and Bhutto flew to Dacca to meet with Mujib. 
Bhutto, however, feared that a compromise would bring upon 
him the wrath of his supporters in West Pakistan. Mujib, 
similarly, could not control the momentum of the Bengali 
demand for an autonomous East Pakistan as the answer to 
their neglect by the more powerful West.
Unable to break the stalemate, and undoubtedly viewing 
Mujib1s version of autonomy as tantamount to independence, 
Yahya arrested Mujib on 25 March and established military 
rule over East Pakistan to suppress the Awami sponsored 
political agitation. The army, drawn almost exclusively 
from the West, unleashed a reign of terror on East 
Pakistan, cracking down on the faculty and students of 
Dacca University, Bengalis in the police and armed 
services, and on all opponents of their regime. Faced with 
the genocidal oppression of the military regime, refugees 
began streaming across the border into India, forcing the 
crisis in Pakistan to assume an international nature.
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INDIAN AND AMERICAN CONCERNS
With the military suppression of East Pakistan in 
March 1971, the United States was caught in a dilemma.
While there was no doubt that the repression in East 
Pakistan was reaching genocidal proportions, the United 
States had few means by which to influence events in 
Pakistan. Even though there was widespread outrage in the 
American bureaucracy, press and Congress over the 
atrocities being committed in East Pakistan, the Nixon 
Administration was silent about these developments. As the 
carnage continued and the White House failed to issue a 
statement of condemnation, Consul General Archer Blood, 
from the American mission in Dacca, sent a strong telegram 
to Washington, signed by nineteen members of the 
Consulate-General, registering "strong dissent” with a 
policy that "serves neither our moral interests, broadly 
defined, nor our national interests, narrowly defined."8 
Similarly, the US Ambassador to New Delhi, Kenneth Keating, 
reported to Washington that he was "deeply shocked at the 
massacre" and was "greatly concerned at the United States1 
vulnerability to damaging association with a reign of 
military terror." He urged the Administration to promptly 
and publicly condemn Yahya1s move and to abrogate the 1970 
"one-time exception" sale to Pakistan.9
Kissinger, in his spirited defense of White House 
policies during 1971 in his memoir, White House Years, 
explains the dilemma:
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The United States could not condone a brutal 
military repression in which thousands of 
civilians were killed and from which millions fled 
to India for safety. There was no doubt about the 
strong-arm tactics of the Pakistani military. But 
Pakistan was our sole channel to China; once it 
was closed it would take months to make 
alternative arrangements.10
Van Hollen, in a devastating reply, challenges many 
of Kissinger's assumptions and conclusions as being 
factually inaccurate. Further, Van Hollen recognises that 
"in addition to the China initiative, Nixon's reaction to 
South Asia was influenced by his long-standing dislike for 
India and the Indians, and his warm feelings toward 
Pakistan.h11
Since there is no dispute over the fact that the White 
House's initial reaction to developments in East Pakistan 
was the result of the China initiative, it is pertinent to 
understand the Sino-US axis that was developing with 
Islamabad as the intermediary.
The opening to China was the major US diplomatic 
initiative in 1971. Since America did not officially 
recognise the People's Republic of China, Pakistan, because 
of its close ties with Beijing, served as the 
"go-between." By April 1971, Islamabad was not only 
Kissinger's point of contact but also the likely point of 
departure for his secret visit to China.12 Given the 
fundamental importance of a diplomatic breakthrough to 
China, the White House was of the opinion that it could not 
afford to antagonise Yahya Khan of Pakistan, the United 
States' channel to China, and the latter's ally. The State
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Department, totally ignorant of the secret China 
initiative— Secretary of State, William Rogers, only 
learned of the initiative in late June13—  moved on its 
own to impose a new arms embargo on Pakistan, including 
holding the equipment from the "one-time exception" in 
abeyance, thereby bringing it into bureaucratic conflict 
with the White House, represented by Kissinger.14
Kissinger contends that, in May 1971, the White House
learned of an Indian decision to launch a lightning attack
to take over East Pakistan, the first evidence they had
that Indian plans could upset American geopolitical
objectives. He writes:
We began increasingly to suspect that Mrs. Gandhi 
perceived a larger opportunity. As Pakistan grew 
more and more isolated internationally, she 
appeared to seek above all Pakistan's humiliation, 
perhaps trying to spread the centrifugal 
tendencies from East to West Pakistan.15
This, however, is not in keeping with the facts.
Grant Mouser, Political Officer in the United States 
Embassy in New Delhi during those tumultuous months of 
1971, suggests that Kissinger, in White House Years, 
glosses over many of the facts in a retrospective attempt 
to justify his actions at a point when they were being 
increasingly criticized. He maintains that although 
everyone at the Embassy in New Delhi, like Kissinger in the 
White House, recognised the inevitability of East 
Pakistan's independence, officials at the Embassy knew of 
no such corroborating information indicating an Indian 
attack.16 Even Van Hollen, acknowledging that Indians
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were engaged in military contingency planning, asserts that 
although Mrs. Gandhi was under strong political pressure to 
act more decisively, there was no evidence that she wanted 
to go to war in the summer of 1971.17 It is thus 
appropriate to turn our attention to India*s interest in 
the East Pakistani crisis.
The Indian Government had, until March 1971, viewed 
developments in Pakistan as the internal affairs of a 
neighbouring country. Preoccupied with general elections 
in India, Mrs. Gandhi adopted a hands-off policy, and, in 
mid-March, Indian officials informed the United States that
, , "I O
India favoured a united Pakistan. °
However, with a major influx of East Pakistani 
refugees into India at the end of March, and with the 
establishment of a Bangladesh government-in-exile on Indian 
soil, Mrs. Gandhi was forced to take cognizance of events 
in Pakistan and formulate a corresponding policy.19 
Indistinguishable from the local Indian populace, the 
refugees had to be isolated to prevent them from disrupting 
Indian economic life and giving vent to existing dissidence 
in the Indian states bordering East Pakistan. Since 
tensions between Indian Bengalis and the local populations 
of Assam and other northeastern states already existed, 
there was constant fear that the addition of East Pakistani 
Bengali refugees would aggravate further the delicate 
political balance.20 The financial crisis caused by 
almost ten million refugees, the danger of a deeper 
economic crisis through inflation and the cessation of
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development, the fear of political disruption in states 
bordering East Pakistan where dissidence already existed, 
and the omnipresent fear of the effects a fusion of the 
radical left in West Bengal with the revolutionary youth of 
East Pakistan would cause, combined to awaken the Indian 
Government to the muti-layered threat the influx of 
refugees posed to broadly defined national security.21 
India*s principal concern became the return of refugees to 
East Pakistan.
While the Indian Government could have recognised the 
independence of Bangladesh and the legitimacy of the 
government-in-exile, this action would not have alleviated 
India*s principal concern, the return of refugees. The 
answer, to India, lay in the formulation of a political 
solution in East Pakistan, the only method that would 
convince the refugees to return. Although there were 
officials who argued that India should recognise an 
independent Bangladesh, others reasoned that Pakistan could 
retaliate by 'recognising' Nagaland, an Indian state that 
had a secessionist movement. Moreover, an Indian military 
attack, if undertaken, had to guarantee success, and with 
the Chinese making threatening noises in the north, this 
option was bound to produce more problems rather than 
facilitate a solution.22
Although Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party had won a 
decisive victory in the 1971 polls, the threat and urgency 
the existence of East Pakistani refugees posed to Indian 
stability made Mrs. Gandhi's position contingent upon her
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ability to send them home.
Yahya Khan announced a plan on 28 June to transfer 
political power to a civilian government. This, however, 
did not provide a solution to the Indian problem. Since 
the Awami League had been outlawed in East Pakistan, no 
civilian government without the Awami League would induce a 
return of the refugees. The options open to India were 
obvious. While an independent Bangladesh under the Awami 
League was the only lasting political solution to the 
crisis in East Pakistan, India would not officially 
recognise an independent Bangladesh until Awami leaders 
demonstrated their ability to retain mass support and win 
control of East Pakistan, thus facilitiating the return of 
the refugees.2 3
Finally, there was the strategic factor as well. 
Although India and Pakistan had been antagonistic 
neighbours for over 23 years, an independent Bangladesh 
would not secure Indiafs eastern border. While Kissinger 
claims that India sought Pakistan's humiliation, an 
uncertain future for East Pakistan under anyone other than 
Pakistan would not have consolidated India's strategic 
position. While there is no doubt in my mind that India 
welcomed an independent Bangladesh under the Awami League 
as it secured India's eastern front, the success of the 
Awami League, rather than a radical government, was 
essential if India was to favour a change to what could 
become a hostile East Pakistan.
As the analysis of the problem shows, both India and
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the United States had vested interests in the political 
crisis in East Pakistan. However, while both governments 
recognised that an independent Bangladesh was inevitable, 
they did not share common interests.24 The White House 
was primarily motivated by its desire to preserve Pakistan 
as its link with China, and was thus reluctant to force the 
pace of developments. India, on the other hand, sought to 
force the pace of developments in East Pakistan to 
facilitate the transfer of refugees. As is clearly 
evident, the United States and India had divergent 
interests in East Pakistan, as well as divergent methods to 
resolve the crisis.
GEOPOLITICAL CALCULATIONS
During the course of Kissinger*s visit to the 
sub-continent in July 1971, two important developments took 
place. First, at his secret meeting with the Chinese, Chou 
En-lai informed Kissinger that China would not remain 
indifferent if India attacked Pakistan.25 Second, after 
the announcement on 15 July of Nixon's forthcoming visit to 
China, Kissinger made it clear to India that Washington 
would not support it in the event of Chinese 
intervention.2 6
A treaty between India and the Soviet Union had been 
under consideration for over a year. It was widely 
recognised that the main deterrent to an Indian attack of 
Pakistan was its fear of Chinese reprisal. Now, with what 
looked like an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis,
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a sense of insecurity overswept the Indian Government.27
While the signing of an Indo-Soviet treaty was a 
plausible development in the near future, the fact that the 
treaty was signed in August was the culmination of the 
geostrategic developments that were taking place around 
India. More specifically, it was an insurance policy to
O Q
deter China from attacking India. As Van Hollen
recognises:
The treaty gave Mrs. Gandhi, who was being 
attacked at home for a weak-kneed policy toward 
Pakistan, a diplomatic triumph by providing India 
with an offset to what many Indians perceived to 
be an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing 
axis.29
By signing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviets, India strengthened its hand 
in promoting its national interests in the evolving 
politics of the sub-continent; if China raised the stakes, 
it risked Soviet reprisal. Moreover, it ensured an 
uninterrupted supply of military equipment to facilitate an 
invasion of East Pakistan, an option that was being 
regarded increasingly as the only solution to the crisis.
Although the White House saw the ultimate evolution of
East Pakistan's independence as inevitable, it viewed the
signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty as having objectively
increased the danger of war.30 Kissinger argues:
The Soviet Union had seized a strategic 
opportunity. To demonstrate Chinese impotence and 
to humiliate a friend of both China and the United 
States proved too tempting. If China did nothing, 
it stood revealed as impotent; if China raised the 
ante, it risked Soviet reprisal. With the treaty,
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Moscow threw a lighted match into a powdered 
keg.31
However, in this regard Kissinger was wrong.
According to Grant Mouser, Kissinger was imposing a 
superpower rivalry on an essentially regional issue, the 
forces of which he did not quite comprehend. * Although 
the treaty implied help in the event of Chinese 
involvement, the treaty implied neither unequivocal Soviet 
support for India nor a cessation of Moscow*s efforts to 
encourage a political settlement. The Soviets favoured a 
settlement agreeable to the "entire people of Pakistan," 
and continued to provide economic assistance to them.33
There is no doubt that the Nixon Administration had 
succeeded in persuading Yahya to soften his stand on a 
number of issues. However, Kissinger failed to recognise 
that the concessions the Pakistanis were willing to make 
were no longer relevant to the crisis in East Pakistan. By 
mid-October, the US had secured a timetable for political 
change from Yahya, a plan that allowed for the leading 
position in government to be held by an East 
Pakistani.34 There was, however, no assurance that the 
civilian government Yahya planned for December would have 
included any Awami Leaguers who reflected the the views of 
Mujib, then under secret trial for treason. Moreover, 
since the Awami League had been banned, the most likely 
representation from the East would have been a puppet 
government, unreflective of the political aspirations of
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the Bengalis.35 Finally, since Mujib and the Bengalis 
were, by late 1971, demanding nothing less than complete 
independence, a demand neither Yahya nor Bhutto could have 
met, there was no solution available that would have 
satisfied both sides.
It was within this context that Mrs. Gandhi visited 
Washington in early November, a visit described by 
Kissinger as "the two most unfortunate meetings Nixon had 
with any foreign l e a d e r . N i x o n  was unable to convince 
Mrs. Gandhi that the civilian government Yahya promised 
would represent Bengali self-determination. Moreover, 
he believed that she purposely deceived him about Indian 
intentions because her generals were preparing military 
plans for West Pakistan while she was still in 
Washington. °
By the middle of November, the inevitability of war 
was apparent. Van Hollen reasons that a number of factors 
combined to make the military option more attractive to 
India: unrelieved pressure of the refugees, a perceived 
lack of progress towards political accommodation in East 
Pakistan, assurances derived from the Indo-Soviet treaty, 
and the probability that the Chinese would not 
intervene. Finally, Mrs. Gandhi had used her visit to 
Western capitals in early November to garner support for 
India*s contention that the continuing threat to India*s 
security, posed by the crisis in East Pakistan, gave New 
Delhi the "right to resolve the situation by any means" to 
ensure that the refugees returned.40
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Between 22 November and 3 December, Indian troops 
crossed the East Pakistani border on a number of occasions, 
ostensibly to quell the shelling of Indian territory from 
East Pakistan, but undoubtedly also to tighten the screws 
on the Pakistan army.41 On 3 December, the war formally 
began when Pakistan launched a major attack on eight Indian 
airfields in northern and western India, and limited stikes 
across the West Pakistan-India border. Yahya1s desperate 
gamble in the west gave India the excuse she needed to 
launch a concerted offensive against East Pakistan, while 
commiting herself to a "holding action" in the West.42
Kissinger contends that once hostilities started, "we 
[Nixon and Kissinger] strove to preserve West Pakistan as 
an independent state, since we judged India's real aim was 
to encompass its disintegration.1,43 The White House 
believed that India's design was to dismember West Pakistan 
and convert it into a "vassal state" by rendering it 
"impotent."44 He credits this assumption to a "reliable" 
source, a report that Nixon and Kissinger were virtually 
alone in the United States in interpreting as they did.45
Since the State Department did not share White House 
assumptions about India's intentions, American policy for 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 was centered in the White 
House, a development that led to a decision to order a 
naval task force to move towards the Bay of Bengal to scare 
off an Indian attack of West Pakistan.46 Convinced that 
Indian intransigience had been fuelled by Moscow's highly 
"inflammatory role," a role that was seen to accomplish
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the humiliation of both China and the United States,
Kissinger viewed the war in a broad geopolitical context.
Our paramount concern transcended the 
sub-continent. The Soviet Union could have 
restrained India; it chose not to. It had, in 
fact, actively encouraged war by signing the 
Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic support to 
India's maximum demands, airlifting military 
supplies, and pledging to veto inconvenient 
resolutions in the UN Security Council. The 
Soviets encouraged India to exploit Pakistan's 
travail in part to deliver a blow to our system of 
alliances, in even greater measure to demonstrate 
Chinese impotence. Since it was a common concern 
about Soviet power that had driven Peking and 
Washington together, a demonstration of American 
irrelevance would severly strain our precious new 
relationship with China.47
Worried that a "client" Indian success would
demonstrate the futility of reliance on either China or the
United States as an ally, Kissinger perceived the
Indo-Pakistan war as a "dress rehearsal for the Middle East
in the spring of 1972," an area where US interests were
A ftconsiderably greater. °
Finally, it was of paramount concern to the White 
House to ensure that the Chinese understood that the US was
, , , . A  Q .not m  collusion with the Soviet Union.  ^ When Kissinger 
met with Huang Hua in New York, the latter adopted a hard 
line that Kissinger interpreted as an indication that the 
Chinese might intervene militarily. Since Moscow had not 
replied positively to American demands to counsel restraint 
to the Indians, the White House, expecting Chinese 
intervention, now considered whether to assist China if the 
Soviet Union retaliated.50 In Kissinger's words:
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Nixon understood immediately that if the Soviet 
Union succeeded in humiliating China, all 
prospects for world equilibrium would disappear.
He decided— and I fully agreed— that if the Soviet 
Union threatened China we would not stand idly 
by.... To provide some military means to give 
effect to our strategy and to reinforce the 
message to Moscow, Nixon now ordered the carrier 
task force to proceed through the Strait of 
Malacca and into the Bay of Bengal.51
As matters turned out, the Chinese reply from Beijing 
was not what the White House expected. On 14 December, 
Soviet representatives reported firm assurances that the 
Indian leadership had no plans of seizing West Pakistani 
territory. On 15 December, the Pakistani commander of East 
Pakistan surrendered to Indian forces, and, on 16 December, 
Mrs. Gandhi ordered an unconditional cease-fire in the 
West.
Kissinger contends that the Indian decision to order a 
cease-fire was a reluctant one resulting from Soviet 
pressure, which in turn grew out of American insistance, 
and the movement of the American fleet into the Bay of 
Bengal.52
However, a 1978 Brookings Institution study of the US 
armed forces as a political instrument concluded its 
examination of the Enterprise deployment in 1971 by 
emphasizing that "Soviet and Indian support for a 
cease-fire was not the result of US military pressure 
generated by Task Force 74."53 Moreover, Van Hollen 
asserts that, once the military issue in East Pakistan was 
resolved, the Soviet Union had been counselling India in
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the direction of a cease-fire in the West all along, 
motivated by Soviet interests in South Asia and not
(54.American pressures.
Finally, there is no evidence to support Kissinger's 
claim that India sought the dismemberment of West 
Pakistan. Having shifted from a position of support for a 
united Pakistan, before April, to an independent Bangladesh 
under the Awami League, so as to guarantee both the return 
of refugees and India's eastern borders, India had already 
attained unquestionable regional dominance in the 
sub-continent.55 Moreover, the dismemberment of West 
Pakistan into four separate states would have created 
enormous political instability along India's western flank 
and encouraged fissiparous tendencies within India. The 
arguement that India did, indeed, have territorial designs 
on West Pakistan, is made even more implausible by the 
fact, which Kissinger fails to mention, that at the time 
the war ended, Indian forces were in control of 
approximately 2,500 square miles of West Pakistan, 
territory from which the Indian army voluntarily withdrew. 
It is, thus, not surprising that officials from the State 
Department and the Embassy in New Delhi did not pay much 
heed to Kissinger's "reliable" intelligence source.
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
As this analysis of events shows, Nixon and Kissinger 
initially reacted to events in East Pakistan with China in 
mind, and to the Indo-Pakistan conflict on the basis of
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calculations about a global strategic triangle between the 
United States, China and the Soviet Union. This was 
particularly unfortunate as it denied an appreciation of 
the more complex and deep rooted issues at stake in the 
sub-continent, a veritable world in itself.
By reacting to developments in South Asia from a 
geopolitical perspective, the United States clashed with 
the regional objectives India sought to achieve. The 
crisis, moreover, surfaced at a time when America was 
pursuing its China initiative, a policy being directed from 
the White House. While there is no denying that the 
opening to China was an issue of far greater strategic 
relevance to the United States than events in the 
sub-continent, because the China initiative was being 
formulated in the White House, events in South Asia came to 
be seen from the White House's geopolitical perspective. 
This perspective, however, clouded the White House's 
judgement and shielded it from from the regional realities 
of the sub-continent, thus obscuring its assessments. As 
Mouser points out, Kissinger viewed the countries of South 
Asia in much the same way as the major European powers had 
historically reacted to the Balkan states, a quarrelsome 
area that upset major power calculations and even caused 
wars in the nineteenth century.56 The regional conflict, 
for the White House, was an event that diverted attention 
from America's opening to China and deliberations over 
Nixon's 1972 summit in Moscow. What the Rudolphs call 
"global parochialism" blinded Nixon and Kissinger, and
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shaped their perceptions of events in South Asia in a way 
that was sure to make them clash with Indian 
perceptions.
While many of the White House's miscalculations 
stemmed from a misapplication of global philosophy to 
regional disputes, the fact that the State Department was 
being ignored in 1971 compounded the problem. Thus, 
although Nixon and Kissinger may have been correct in 
reasoning that China would react adversely to any hard 
stand the US adopted towards Pakistan, the White 
House-centered system was ill equipped to handle a 
multi-faceted regional crisis that had never been on the 
regular White House agenda.
The White House, as a result, looked upon India's 
interest in the crisis as an excuse to settle old scores by 
"dismembering" West Pakistan, and the relatively balanced 
nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship as an analogy for a 
Soviet "client" acting in concert with Moscow to 
"humiliate" American alliances. This geopolitical 
perspective denied an appreciation of regional realities 
that permitted solely Indian interests: the existence of 
refugees posed a threat to India, a balance it sought to 
redress; the dismemberment of Pakistan, however intense the 
Indo-Pakistani antagonism may have been, probably would 
have threatened Indian security rather than consolidated 
it.
Leaving aside the more complex issue of assessments 
and true intentions during 1971, there is an almost
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unanimous verdict from both Indian and American scholars
that American foreign policy for South Asia during the
India-Pakistan crisis of 1971 was the result of three
factors: America's China initiative? Nixon's personal
dislike for India, in general, and Mrs. Gandhi, in
particular; and the perception of a continued superpower
rivalry in South Asia.58 Thus, as a result of
perceptions and a combination of these three factors, the
United States terminated all economic assistance for India,
"tilted" towards Pakistan, accused India of being the
"aggressor" in the 1971 war, and, finally, Nixon ordered a
Task Force headed by the USS Enterprise into the Bay of
Bengal to intimidate India. 3
Passions, as a result of these developments, ran high
in India. On 3 December, reacting to Nixon's threat that
an Indian attack of Pakistan would result in the
termination of American aid to India, Mrs. Gandhi told a
gathering of Congress workers in New Delhi:
Times have changed in the last five years. If any 
country thinks that by calling us aggressor it can 
pressurize us to forget our national interests 
then that country is living in its own fool's 
paradise and it is welcome to that.... Today we 
will do what is best in our national interests and 
not what these so-called big nations would like us 
to do. We value their friendship, help and aid 
but we cannot forsake the country's territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.60
Similarly, an Indian newspaper, commenting on Indo-US
relations, said:
One of the casualties of the Indo-Pakistani war is 
surely whatever little was left of Indo-American 
goodwill. The anti-India bias of President Nixon 
in the last eight months has already caused
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serious damage. The unnecessary display of 
strength inherent in the despatch of the Seventh 
Fleet to the Bay of Bengal made things even 
worse. Little that the USA may now attempt by way 
of amends will ever restore it fully since Indian 
public opinion, even if public opinion is 
proverbially short, will not soon forget that 
President Nixon was apparently prepared to create 
a second Bay of Pigs in the sub-continent at a 
time when the freedom of 75 million people was at 
stake.
As can be seen, Indo-American relations appeared to 
have reached their nadir by the end of 1971. The issue of 
greatest relevance to this thesis, as this analysis of 
events shows, is that relations in 1971 were determined by 
the international strategic environment. Indian and 
American strategic perceptions and interests diverged, and 
with the divergence of interests and perceptions over 
issues as wide as they were in 1971, relations plummetted.
However, as mentioned in Chapter One, irrespective of 
what the US position with regard to India was, the 
difference in status between the two countries forced India 
to regard the United States as a central figure in her 
foreign policy planning. In 1972, Mrs. Gandhi despatched 
her most senior foreign service bureaucrat, T.N. Kaul, to 
Washington as Ambassador in an effort to mend fences.
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carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt toward Pakistan 
and he believes that every briefing or statement is going 
the other way." He later added, "It's hard to tilt toward 
Pakistan, as the President wishes, if every time we take 
some action in relation to India we have to do the same for 
Pakistan." His sarcasm was directed at bureaucrats from 
the State Department who questioned the assessments on the 
Indo-Pakistan crisis. Ibid., p. 897.
60Quoted in Statesman (Calcutta), 3 December 1971, p.
1.
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61Ibid., 17 December 1971, p. 8.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the status of Indo-US relations 
between 1947 and 1972, we now turn our attention to an 
analysis of the principal factors that determined the 
course of these relations. What this thesis argues is 
that, because relations were never planned, they have been 
unpredictable. Because of the extremely limited contact 
between the two countries prior to 1947, and the different 
historical experiences and geographical locations of the 
two countries, Indo-US relations seldom were formed 
directly, as the product of a bilateral recognition of 
shared interests, but were left aside, ultimately to be 
moulded by the international strategic environment. 
Moreover, the uncharted and shifting pattern of Indo-US 
bilateral relations between 1947 and 1972 is the result of 
continuously changing perceptions by both countries during 
this period. Thus, bilateral relations between 1947 and 
1972 were marked by a 'zig-zag* pattern.
By the time India emerged from colonial rule as a 
sovereign state in 1947, the United States was the world's 
leading diplomatic, economic and military power.
Containing the twin threats of the Soviet Union and 
international communism had, by 1947, become the
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corner-stone of American foreign policy. India, however, 
did not share this objective. As the first Asian nation to 
win its independence from her colonial rulers, fighting 
colonialism and representing Asian interests were the chief 
objectives of the new Indian government. Moreover, 
although India was clearly benevolent to the United States' 
global position, the perception of being regarded as truly 
independent precluded the possibility of a close 
association with the United States.
India and the United States, therefore, had separate 
interests and objectives, the result of different 
historical experiences, geographic locations, and the 
difference in status between the two countries. India, as 
a result, chose a policy of non-alignment from the military 
blocs to represent its interests, a deliberate choice to 
distance itself from the evolving nature of global 
politics. Having made this decision, a weak, newly 
independent India had little to offer the United States, a 
global power fully engaged in the Cold War.
The fall of China to communism in 1949 represented a 
watershed in American strategic thinking. The United 
States adopted NSC-68 as its strategic doctrine, and 
initially looked upon India as a potential Asian ally. 
India, however, was concurrently improving relations with 
its northern neighbour, and declared its Asian interests 
and objectives to be in congruence with those of communist 
China, interests of the latter that the US sought to deter.
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The fall of China to communism, the explosion of a 
Soviet atomic bomb, and the evolving crisis in Korea 
dictated American foreign policy. Having decided upon a 
strategy of perimeter defense, the United States sought to 
recruit allies on the Asian mainland. India, however, by 
commiting itself to a policy of non-alignment and 
friendship with China, disqualified itself from 
consideration, a development that led to its rival 
neighbour, Pakistan, entering a military pact with the 
United States in 1954.
Dulles regarded a policy of non-alignment as 
"immoral," a view that led to the isolation of India by the 
United States between 1954 and 1960. The summary of events 
supports the view that this isolation of India was the 
result of divergent strategic perceptions leading to 
divergent interests and objectives between the two 
countries, a situation that, in the 1950s, necessitated 
American indifference towards Indian interests.
John Kennedy entered the White House in 1961 with 
views on non-alignment and the Third World that differed 
fundamentally from those of the preceeding administration. 
Convinced that the economic competition between India and 
China would determine the future of Asia, he committed 
himself to improving Indo-American bilateral relations.
With China's attack of India in 1962, Nehru's Government 
came to share the American interest in opposing India's 
northern communist neighbour, a convergence of interests 
that facilitated United States' support of India in 1962.
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The Harriman Mission, the most visible expression of 
American support of India in 1962, indicated to Nehru that 
long term US support had to be preceeded by India resolving 
its long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. 
Although this opposed declared Indian interests, India 
recognised that it was a necessary development in order to 
secure American assistance, thus leading to a shift in the 
Indian position on Kashmir.
After the 1962 conflict, Indian military preparedness 
had to be given a more realistic dimension, a development 
that required substantial American assistance. The Kennedy 
Administration was prepared to meet Indian requirements, 
and Nehru agreed to support the United States' position in 
Southeast Asia, a commitment he had refused to make in 
1961. This shift in Indian perceptions was the result of 
the recognition that any potential treaty with the United 
States, as was being negotiated at the time, meant a more 
benevolent Indian view of American interests, a compromise 
Nehru was willing to make.
Even though deliberations between the United States 
and India in 1963-64 did not result in the signing of a 
treaty, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 fits in well with my 
argument. When President Johnson, exasperated with Indian 
and Pakistani intransigience, imposed an arms embargo on 
the sub-continent in 1965, inherent in the decision was a 
belated American recognition that divergent American and 
sub-continental historical experiences and locations led to 
divergent strategic interests. Although the United States
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provided military assistance to Pakistan to bolster the 
latter's defenses to contain a perceived northern communist 
threat, the 1965 war served as a realisation that while 
communism was the ostensible reason for the US-Pakistan 
treaty of 1954, Pakistan looked upon India, not communism, 
as its primary threat.
The third and final study, the 1971 East Pakistan 
crisis and the subsequent Indo-Pakistan war, is perhaps the 
best example of the divergence in interests and objectives 
between the United States and India.
The United States had a geopolitical interest in the 
crisis, while India's involvement stemmed from a more 
immediate regional perspective. Although the two countries 
were not pitted against each other, they defined their 
interests and objectives in a manner that encroached upon 
the other's interest. Thus, 1971 witnessed a period when 
the clash of interests and objectives, born out of 
divergent strategic perspectives, led to a period of 
extremely strained Indo-American bilateral relations. Even 
more interesting, from the perspective of this thesis, is 
the fact that this clash of interests was the result of 
perspectives made from divergent planes: a geopolitical 
perspective, one that takes the global equilibrium into 
consideration, versus a regional view. The difference in 
perspectives, moreover, was a manifestation of the 
divergence in strategic importance between the two 
countries: the United States was a superpower; India had 
regional aims and ambitions.
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On 11 August, 1971, Kissinger notes, "Nixon admitted 
to the Senior Review Group that in Mrs. Gandhi's position 
he might pursue a similar course."1 But he was not.
Whilst Nixon may have understood Mrs. Gandhi's concerns and 
reasons for behaving as she did, India's actions, 
nevertheless, jeopardised American interests. Thus, the 
effect of the events of 1971 was a period of extremely 
strained bilateral relations.
In the final analysis, the contention that 
Indo-American relations were moulded by the international 
strategic environment holds true. Moreover, the period 
between 1947 and 1972 demonstrates that close bilateral 
relations hinged upon the convergence of strategic 
perceptions and interests. Thus, the characterization of 
Indo-US relations as a series of alternating currents is 
perhaps an apt one. The alternations, moreover, can be 
described as follows: security pacts vs. non-alignment 
(1947-54); friendship and convergence of interests 
(1961-64) vs. alienation (1954-60); global aspirations vs. 
regional realities (1971).
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NOTES for CONCLUSION
^■Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1979), p. 879.
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